

Research Article

## Cross-Cultural Pragmatic Formula of Begging Speech Act: A Hermeneutical (Re-Cognitive) Developmental Approach

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### ABSTRACT

The concern of a bit-category, of speech act theory is situated in a hermeneutical pragmatic terrain. In a developmental approach, begging act is discussed to hermeneutic the pragmatic begging process via felicitous replying act, via multiple strategies which are utilized to communicate cross-cultural message, which is mostly based on English data with reference to Arabic Language, for a more pragmatic hermeneutic than for a differentiation since begging act is positioned, according to Leech (2014), on the blurry outlines, of request territory, to become an unavoidable question nowadays. This approach earnestly discriminates begging act at the nature of inputs and outputs of human capacities. Collateralized trajectories, of the targeted act, are absorbing and sustaining the hermeneutical likelihood of the businesslike atmosphere. Throughout its based realization, the cognitive consummation is abode the wholesome relinquishments to the cogent and gnostic argumentation. Then, persuasive tactics will supply polite situations with how they are exploited in appetite ways, which sometimes devolve to impolite maqams. Accordingly, apt attention will indigenize the diversity of the addressed terms of solidarity and power. Furthermore, enhancing awesome sprinkled conclusion will somehow curb contemporaneous repercussions of the ambiguous use with aid of the hermeneutical tackle and pragmatic modulation.

### 1. The Homogeneous Use of Acts or Things: An Introduction

Most linguists, philosophers, and specialists see language as an autonomous lawful system of more than fixed symbols, tokens, and abstract rules for their doctrinaire combination, which are defined dependently of their contexts of use. The uses of well-formed implications, which make by users, consequently, are deemed as the concern of those workers in. In other words, a language is a tool of expressing of semantic, culture, and cognition meaning since its meaning, as shown by Wierzbicka (1992), is used when we feel, think, perceive, beg, etc., and when we want to express our request, feelings, thoughts and perceptions to share them with other persons within one language or from one language to another.

Between any two communicators, individually or within a group, there is an unexclusive idea talk which represents apart or one aspect of liaison. Even though some and certain languages at least differ, ostensibly, from each other, that our approach affirms here, according to many linguistic, philosophical, and anthropological theories as well as those pioneers' theories, that all human or natural languages are planted similar at its simplicity, complexity, dynamicity, and details. For instance, all these languages naturally can supply a means for making some requests or begs, making strong assertions, giving offers or promises, asking the question, and so on. At the same time, there is an encounter use among languages since there is nothing that can be discussed in one language that cannot be expressed in any other. Consequently, with modernism, the necessity of invention may have come if some of these languages have terms not found in another. Thus, supported by the preceding

explanations, these human languages are communicatively analogous in their general universal principles, guises, and khanates (Akmajian et al., 1995).

Rhetorically, with signs of vocalizations only, the identification will not be stood out since, according to Al-Jurjani's<sup>2</sup> (2010) logical explanations, those mere vocalizations do not work unless they combine in a precise combination on the one hand, whilst the implications of these enunciations should intentionalize to one conscious aspect than another, within conscious circulation and arrangement. Otherwise, those spoken or written words or sets of words may be redundant, and their particularization of meaning will be nonsense.

The sense of language, as in Cruse's (2000) elucidation, is to communicate about things, happenings, or any other states of affairs in this world. He adds that one way of approaching the detect of the meaning of these things or acts and words and/or expressions lies in an attempt to correlate these compounding processes in the language in use with aspects of our world. Holfmann (1993) also shows that there is no doubt that some difficulties discuss bits of talk and what these ingredients' meaning is, where we can go with, and how these ideas, bits, and later on, acts fit things or world ultimately. Grammarians and rhetoricians, according to Al-Awsi's (1988) explanations, are concerned with requests' styles, and they are introduced several sporadic remarks on these requestive styles' nature, as well as the precise meaning of each one in use. They trace these styles in general, viz., the reason for what they are used behind why they are sometimes deemed bad or good and their additional meaning in particular, for instance, irrogative, command, prohibition, display, and specification, asking, requesting, and begging. Thus, they are dealt with expressions' tectonic meaning which is accompanied by their problems of forms and functions as well as their cultural semantic and pragmatic used in language.

However, in detecting these acts of speech, Leech (1983) shows that there are useful distinctions, where Austin, Searle, as well as many others, have made classifications of these accomplishable acts. The most attentions of these studies focus on these acts' meaning in use. Furthermore, for successful communicative distinctions, there are some close similarities between the sorts of these acts and their functions of behavior since these distinctions are deemed as an excellent guide to various and different acts.

To qualify these distinctions as a part of the cultural pragmatic meaning, these distinctions result various sorts of acts, according to Searle's (1969) processing, must be obtained at input and output conditions wherein an addressor<sup>3</sup> and an addressee collaborate (and speaks the same language to satisfy), understand, and interpret these acts (or force) or things effectively via their spoken language. Thus, the various use or function of these forces must meet the intended meaning of the cognitive agent's action intentionally if the latter pragmatically wants his/her assumptions of conditions performed as a faithful reflection of the talk's nature.

## 2. The Hermeneutical Definition of (Directives Category and) Begging Category

Linguistics and other communicative spheres in general nowadays have, in detail, the most less-known bits of the speech act theory as a universal phenomenon in the light of extending literature of the core of pragmatics. Directives as a macro category and begging act as a micro bit-category represent the most influential core of this study to perform a precise action in response to the previously encoded message, which is governed by social traditional norms of each society. Since the scope of the very few traditional approaches is very restricted in its development of begging speech act, this developmental approach is a *hermeneutical* one in its cross-cultural pragmatic discussions since it is very difficult, as shown by Palmer (1981, p. 163), in practice to govern whether a specific kind of utterance is to be featured as a precise kind of speech act. Hence, it is very important to know why any person, a child or an adult, needs to learn to respond to any noise or sounds which his/her community persons can produce in an attitudinal verbal exchange or talking from a need to proceed, via communication, to make a performative use of speech.

However, communicative intents, as an important step of indirect communicative speech act, can be expressed in many and various ways. Since the developmental deed, in this study, will be centered on the addressor's encoded-action and addressee's decoded-action, Ninio and Snow (1996), strictly speaking, manifest that the most prominent instance, hither, is the family of directives. Although it is very known that apart of outspoken orders or begs are mostly asked divergent

<sup>2</sup> The translated information from Arabic sources, is mine.

<sup>3</sup> The "addressor" term can refer to the speaker, talker, beggar or any person does the act of begging.

questions about the recipient's ability or desirableness to achieve an act, there are numerous indirect ways in which the addressor can communicate the want that these actions are supposed to be accomplished. Moreover, the result of how to use language, for asking questions, making statements, giving guarantees, using requests or begs, and so on, can be seen as a necessary knowledge for a suitable rule which is governed the employment of discourse in an interpersonal occurrence, and all these are linguistically named as the illocutionary acts of speech.

In a modifying process of performative force as a *pragma-hermeneutical* approach, Al-Abd (2011) shows that the speech act theory has two kinds of meaning, in a *hermeneutical* circularity, both, are worked as a complementary to the general scope of meaning, that they are force and purpose. Al-Abd affirms that the strength of meaning means the degree of force to each precise meaning whilst the purpose of meaning cares about the function to the goal of the exact meaning. Accordingly, we can elaborate that directives, for example, has the highest degree of force in performing an action like begging, requesting, or asking, and it also has a function to each purpose of meaning as in *"Can you pass me that heavy suitcase, please?"* which works as a question from an interrogative point of view and as a beg from a functional viewpoint if an addressee is an uncooperative person. Cognition as a cultural pragmatic concept, as shown by Carston (2002, p. 127), responsibly, in a potential manner, works as a mental processing system for interpreting ostensible communicative stimuli which has effectuated a mutation in the issues of pragmatics, as well as, other kinds of explanations.

Another integrated aspect of begging intention occurs between an addressor meaning and an utterance meaning to uncover a gap of meaning that is represented the goal of an addressee, and by this encoded hint, the latter may perform a signal of begging as a requestive hint or potential ask to do some targeted permissions for the former's exploitation. The addressor, in the following exchange between Z and Y, manifests that:

*Z-That is a very delicious library.*

*Y-Pause! Are you sure that it is...? (He is ignorantly observing to another thing).*

*Z-I can expect, there, more beautiful things, but they are somehow expensive ones.*

*Y-Pause! (He is uninterestingly eyeing to the library.)*

*Z-Would you like to take a glance at them, please!*

*Z-Let's go, please...!*

It is a consequence that the intended gap of exploitation of hints of begging embodies the above instance and, according to Weizman's (1989) elaborations, the critical notion of what the addressee identifies reflects the lack of transparency of the utterance whether it is a pure request or asking for a permission. Yet, we think that it is, in fact, a hint of begging especially when the latter has some exact reason to believe that the addressor does not intend to communicate via only the utterance meaning since, as s/he justifies that, the belief of the addressor has some hidden intentions. Throughout the indirection of meaning, Weizman adds that the addressee's interpretation process may require significant components which elaborate the definite hints that we scientifically consult Weizman for. More details are in the following:

*i-Computing the meaning of an utterance;*

*ii-Finding out some reasons and purposes to believe that it diverges from the addressor's meaning;*

*iii-Totalizing the alternative meaning of an utterance;*

*iv-Assaying whether it may cognitively converge with an alternative addressor's meaning;*

*v-Ultimately, assigning the alternative meaning of the addressor to the targeted utterance.*

Thus, it is concluded that the gap, between the utterance meaning and the alternative meaning on the one hand, and the addressor's meaning on the other, can be identified as a begging speech act via the best exploitation of the conventional indirectness, which is guided, later on, semantically and pragmatically, by the addressee as the accomplishable agent of the course of action (viz., begging speech act), as an indirect hint to a performative act since it works in the deep arcane zone of request intention to fulfill the function of begging speech act as a deep core of demanding exploitation.

In an attempt to shed light on a comparable approach notion in Arabic, Al-Awsi discusses the act of begging, within groups of request's styles, thru the idea of a plea as in the following example wherever it is accompanied with the implicit requesting pronoun to produce, as I conclude, a detailed formula:

*A plea + hidden request = begging in response: O thee may already suffice you (1988, p. 219).*

Accordingly, the notion of a plea is concerned, as the sounds which are used for alerting the addressee's reaction to the addressor's action, viz., it is abrayed the addressee to listen and perform what is beyond the addressor's alerting words, in

particular, according to Syybiwiyah (as cited in Al-Awsi, 1988, p. 218), the former rather than someone else via obvious or hidden addressor's begging which preceded, by the abraid bit of, their conversation.

One of the most undisclosed illocutions of directives whose cognitive agent has a high degree of willingness and achievement among other peers of forces, as shown by Verschueren (1979, 1985), is the begging speech act. According to pragmatic parameters, most linguists, like Verschueren, Vanderveken, and others, regard the speech act of begging is as one of the radical elements in designing politeness solutions toward the problems of trying to save the addressee's reaction persuasively. Verschueren (1980) adds that the state (or case) effects of the performative act has been changed by the subject, for example, to promise, to beg, to order, to state, or to ask, and this state contains at least a mental reaction and an action on the addressee's side of the targeted speech act to which is being referred to. In other words, the addressor tries to persuade the addressee to do a specific course of action under a *hermeneutical* aspect of requestive conditions, depending on the state of the world, which is supposedly characterized by those two interlocutors via a set of justifications.

Likewise, Drew and Couper-Kuhlen discuss the idea of asking others for doing things throughout request or beg or different ways of demanding. Characteristically, they diagnose the directions to update wh-aptness enquires, as in the following clarification:

*Whoever we are and wherever we live, whatever language we speak, whatever work we do, whatever our status or 'position' in society, whatever domestic arrangements we have and generally whatever our circumstances, almost every day in our lives we ask someone to do something for us* (Drew and Couper-Kuhlen, 2014, p. 1).

It is a consequence that one of the most essential and ubiquitous activities in our social and reciprocal interaction is the speech act of begging (or requesting or demanding or asking, and so on). If we elucidate one of these social communication means, for example, begging, as a function of asking, we can find that it is as a means which should be extensively taken to involve other means of questioning like, for instance, sign language. Sometimes, one might demand a coffee glassful again by pushing his mug against the table wherein the other hospitality person sits near a coffee's pot, while in a related conversation, at times is continuing with the same person who is holding the pot of coffee or another one (which it usually happens in the Arabic communication culture).

The more we explore here is the conscious communication which represents, according to Sarhan's (2011) explanations of utterances, the process that depends on its two fundamental pillars, viz., the addressor and the addressee. Meanwhile, an agent's speech would be named as an unconscious one unless his/her conscious or targeted (words and deeds) utterances are certainly exploited toward particularize addressee. Otherwise, a receiver's speech would not be a conscious one only if s/he could be attracted to the addressor's message. In other words, begging speech act, is as a conscious utterance in a conscious communication, would be a communicative one if the addressor's speech core has a sensible meaning on the one hand, and if the addressor's code of message goes to a great length to improve much more congenial esteem to his/her addressee on the other hand.

In a harmonious situation, it is concluded that Odebunmi and Mathangwane (2015) tacitly show that the speech act of begging is performatively accomplished in indirect and direct communication. In an indirect interaction, it occurs when there is no correlation between the structure and function, whereas, in direct or conscious contact, it is done when there is a correlation between the form and function. They affirm Adebite's view that the addressor, addressee, and the others' utterances do not only depend on their knowledge of the language's system and conventions, but also on their knowledge of the contextual behavior, of the factors of situations in which the cultural pragmatic communication takes place.

Although Austin, Searle, Bach and Harnish, and others who classify speech acts according to the cognitive agent's role and world-to-word relationship to get the addressee ending his/her addressor's want. Speech acts can be distinguished via either their syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic aspects in general, or *as in the cases of request, beg, order, command, threat, offer* which inconsistently and mainly differentiate from each other, but at the same time, they have many avoidable intersections on the other hand. In using these directive acts, Becker (1982) and Achiba (2003) agree on the border sense of the implicit begging act within its macro characteristics of the request. Begging speech act deals with an utterance where its intended sense inclusively denotes the addressor's high want to orchestrate the addressee's behavior to do some beneficiary thing or some advantageous action for the former's one.

Based on the social structure to perform the distinguishing genre of speech acts, Taleghani-Nikazm (2006) says that, in everyday conversation, begging is used as a type of social action. Consequently, the co-participant will perform an action depending on an interactional aim of the first addressor's will wherein the benefit is for him, rather than that his/her addressee, at the time of speaking of that act (viz., begging via deixis) which is performed or at some later point. Meanwhile, Pérez (2001) shows that the addressor's high will of begging characteristics creates the weakest illusion of that addressor. In this case, the addressor will depend on the addressee's more magnificent appearance. In other words, the latter has an extraordinary power over the former who is, maybe, in an inferior level, which stems from his/her ability to bring about, with a more excellent choice, the state of affairs that are needed by the beneficiary.

It is importantly inferring, the least not the last, that begging speech act has an appropriate mutually characteristics within directives category of speech acts to either its relation to other brotherhood speech acts or to other (alien) categories of speech act theory. According to this assumption, the addressor assumes that the addressee, as the potential agent of the action, will already attempt, if s/he does not accomplish, to perform his/her desired action. Therefore, the speech act of begging, as shown by Vanderveken (1990), has two distinctive usages: the first is to beg as in "*I beg your pardon*" is to request, mode of achievement politely, and the second is to beg as in the precise case of '*beggar*' is to request humbly and habitually begging, while I regenerate the situation with *begger* for moral and humane things as in a kindest wife's speech in Arabic to her feverish opinionated husband, for instance, have a cold bath, "*Please, dear! I beg you.*" In other words, the higher degree of strength of begging act is not derived from the increased authority at the addressor's part whether in a face to face situation or not, but it comes instead from the higher intensity of the expressing desire as well as the more humiliate manner between the addressor and the addressee whether they are individuals, groups, organizations, institutions, charities, directly (or a vis-à-vis) or indirectly.

As a consequence, the meaning of utterances, as in Sarhan's expository inference, has a presupposed nature which could be changed under the manners of addresses, as well as this audition would step out the noticeable (chronical) position since any cautious meaning may belong to the remarkable scope (logical embodiment) since, according to Ducrot's views, as it is mentioned in Sarhan's (2011, p. 125) expose, the meaning does not sometimes appear depending on its immediate guessing or feeling things, but it will be as in any scientific deduce, on agglutinative assumptions since every performative utterance distinguishes via its outcoming flexibility which helps in making multiple choices and approaches.

### **3. The Trajectory of Begging and Latency of Directives: Investigation and Categorization**

Various endeavors have been made to categorize acts of speech (within speech act theory) to differentiate them from one language interaction to another. Even though several posterior classifications are tried to improve or reformulate, the primary stone of these acts' classifications still contains the most significant criteria. However, I can say that most, if not all, of these taxonomies, seek the category of request and the so close interrelated (potential) begging act which underlies the umbrella of directives forthrightly and/or noncommittally.

Indeed, the originality view of Austin's speech act theory in 1962 shows that his classification turned from its preliminary version of precise acts into accomplishable forces, in general, for instance, order, beg, command, urge, proclaim, thank, give, and direct, which have been elaborated as in the category of exercitives or sometimes named as behabitives and the conclusive well-known named as directives in Searle's (1979) latest taxonomy of beg, invite, plead, and request, which are worked by the addressor to get the co-participant (or addressee) doing the beneficiary acts wherein they are given as a decision in favor or advocacy of a certain course of event or action. These directives take up an attitude, and accomplish the act by committing the addressee to the connection of meaning and its implication.

Clearly, Searle shows, in an elaborated example, "*Look here, Smith, pay attention to what I am saying,*" (1969, p. 59) that the actual speech situation supposed that the targeted addressees know illocution acts' rules of performance. By sharing Searle's general views (as in the intended foregoing example "*Look here, Smith...*"), we manifest that the addressor is either questioning Smith precisely or begging a third one for what will s/he want beyond paying the whole audiences' attention. Thus, the one who ask, or maybe the *begger/beggar* is not begging or imploring, after his/her high willingness, for something requested or begged, before his/her earning his/her interlocutors' attention.

Because of the purpose of the addressor's speech is to gain his/her addressee's benefits, Al-Hashimi (2010) potentially refers the importance of how does the addressor vouchsafe his/her message to the addressee, as in the following, via three aspects:

- i-The addressee does not need to confirm the addressor's message since the former does not deny the latter's desire and want.*
- ii-When the addressee hesitates about the addressor's sincere message and information, the former needs to confirm the latter's real message.*
- iii-When the addressee repudiates the addressor's message, the former will not notarize the latter's code of the message. Therefore, the latter has needed to confirm his/her demand with more than one evidence either it is a positive or a negative one.*

Thus, the mutual relationship, between the addressor and the addressee, is available since the interpretation of utterance, according to Palmer (1995, p. 75), can now be cognitively defined as “*a process of natural deduction from some initiating set of premises to some conclusion*” and this inevitably elaborates some discoursing tactics and cultural pragmatic exploitation.

As cited in Achiba (2003, p. 6), Ervin-Tripp (1976, 1977) pragmatically employs the category of directives for the interlocutors' needs and divides it into six genres, as in the following:

- i-Need statements;*
- ii-Permission directives;*
- iii-Question directives;*
- iv-Imperatives;*
- v-embedded imperatives; and*
- vi-Hint.*

Moreover, Gordon and Ervin-Tripp (1984) adopt the same aforementioned classification, but they concern with a request term, as a macro-category, instead of the directives category. Later on, Wolfson (1989) uses Ervin-Tripp's classifications. The latter exposes his view via the terms of requests and directives. Likewise, Turner (1999, p. 418) elaborately shows that there are four directive values in distinguishing possibilities and options of doing some actions *like begging act* by the cognitive agent of the action. These values of directives are like in the following:

- i-permission,*
- ii-advice,*
- iii-request, and*
- iv-an order.*

The applicable logical operations on directives' values make Turner (1999) generates another comparative strength via begging and asking which are added to the first two formers of directive values since, according to forgoing considerations, the propositional content of begging is asked for making a vast difference, when what is asked, for the addressor.

Since the speech (either it is written or spoken) represents an executory conduct of a language, Al-Sakkaki (1937) shows, as cited in Abd al-Mutalib's (2007, pp. 201-2) book “*Al-Balaagha Al-Arabia*”, that there is an intimate relationship between the two communicators, viz., the person who gives the beneficiary thing and the person who begs to get that beneficial thing. Throughout this formula, Al-Sakkaki elaborates that the capability of the semantic weight of some compositions, *like begging, requesting, demanding*, sometimes tend to the addressor(s) and sometimes else to the addressee(s). One of the most influential things of these advantageous accesses is its entrance into approbation when the highest beneficial thing (viz., the grossest useful thing) reaches the degree of an approbatory impact of the addressor to the addressee. We can accordingly extract in a consequence that the deep level of the ostensible one of the mother-his nagging boy dialogue: “*Do not ask me again,*” can imply that do not beg me for them again since the evaluation of the condition of the performative deep structure will pay unconscious misconception out of the recipient's mind and thus this will maintain the addressee's reply that there is something (or another thing) else at that/these performative propositional findings.

Throughout a magical view, Verschueren (1980) mixes between the accomplishing results of speech acts and these particularized acts. These acts, strictly speaking, constitute the notion of an event or an act firstly, and an exact change as a result of that event or force secondly. On this account, these acts of speech (viz., beg, request, ask, etc.) are communicative acts. They consist of two axes, the act, which is performed by an addressor, represents the first axis of the successful case, while, the change of state at the addressee's mind reflects the second axis of the resulting act of the addressor. Thus, begging, requesting, demanding, and asking reflect an apt instance of these mental reactions.

However, Mey (2001) shows that the precise speech act as in begging, and the generic speech acts as in directives embody a specific effort on the side of addressor to get the addressee to achieve something towards some goals. In this process, there is a clear distinction between world to words wherein the former is fitted and adapted to the intended words via making things occur per the purposes, aims, wishes. Therefore, I observe that the addressee will be obliged to perform things whether these performatives are promissory or benefactory ones. Thus, we use language and speech acts as well as its functions and uses, especially begging, to perform all/most of the things throughout speaking or writing or/and gesturing via giving of benefactors or asking for beneficiaries.

In the contextual environments, there is a qualitatively need to quantitatively dynamic settings between the things (world) that we perform by words *like directives and begging speech acts* and to what addressor's intention is based on getting the addressee to do something. Since there is a correlation, as shown by Lee (1989, 1993), between begging speech act's multiple communicative functions and the number of forms where that act's meaning is used to express them, there is no complete and precise function, synonym, and form in natural language, even though it is found in its oldest principle version, since the primary reason preserves so many types of directives, for instance, to express its greatest variety of communicative functions that allows for more forms of any act's kind via its variety of subtypes of that targeted act on the one hand and its indirect targeted type which approximately results from exploiting preparatory agreement of the illocutionary force of beg speech act on the other. Therefore, it is a consequence that, the more multi-functions, the more multi-conditions will ergo due to the more multi-forms as a fruitful manipulation act. Linguistic and cross-cultural pragmatic activities within our social forms of English and Arabic life inevitably evolve with time (viz., they are done throughout deixis of time) and therefore, requestive structures, according to Abu al-Edous' (2007) explanation, shall be workable if the addressee replies them in a genuinely situational events *as in the case of command or request (as in doing this/that thing)*. Because of the command and potential request sometimes occurred out of their working field, this will be due, via their purposes, to move out from their being true to constitute ordinary rhetorical commands. There are, consequently, several forms of command meaning can figuratively collide with its formal forms of meaning to retrieve other purposing environmental aspects of meaning *like request, advise, suggest, beg, as in begging things by the down-agent to the up-agent, weaker-agent to the stronger-one, and so on*. Sometimes, it is occurred by the same interlocutors-level like a begging conversation which is done between two classmates or friends. By accomplishing an illocutionary act, the addressee is supposedly to be positive about the addressor, as shown by Boguslawski (1983) and Aijmer (2013), to save the latter's face especially when the former knows the latter's part of intention as an observer's function which has the necessary surmise about the addressor's purpose. If the addressor, for example, may consciously utter the sentence: *"I want you to do it, please!"* s/he may indirectly mean it as a directive begging act. Calculatingly, certain forms tend to use conventional uses besides these indirect parts of directive speech acts since the derivation of addressee's result of the act depends on the conversational implicature and the shared background knowledge. Consequently, verbal and non-verbal behavior is not only the output of indirect principles, but it is also determined by social and cultural norms. As a recapitulation and according to the explanation given in above, Al-Ddahi (2011) shows that the two pillars of persuasion and endogenization are concerned with dynamicity of the performative act of begging via the cognitive agent of the action (here the addressor) to make the other (here the addressee) doing a specific communicative course of action. So the language of begging is the elaborative bridge, whether it is, according to some linguists' views, as it is mentioned by Mukhtar (2006, p. 229), vocabularies in itself adaptation or counterpart in its characteristics. Therefore, we choose the most effective Al-Ddahi's (2011) fundamentals, which will be locatively discussed later on, like the agreement of the two agents' understanding, the morality of conversation, the successful exploitation of words and deeds, and their mutuality within various norms of cultures.

Furthermore, Wierzbicka (1987) classified begging speech act under the category of asking, which includes, within *such acts as ask, beg, request, beseech, implore, appeal, plead, apply, intercede, urge, persuade/dissuade, and convince*. Her classification also seeks to cyclize the meaning of these acts onto some various enquires as in the following precise example of beg speech act:

*I want something to happen that will be good for me  
I know I can't cause it to happen  
I feel something because of that  
I know that you cause it to happen  
I assume that you don't want to do it  
I say: I want you to do it  
I know that you don't have to do what I say I want you to do  
I don't want to stop saying that I want this to happen  
I say this because I want to cause you to do it*

*I think of you as someone who can cause me to feel something more than good or something more than bad* (p. 53).

Consequently, the person, who begs for something, as shown by Wierzbicka (1987), wants something good, for him/her, to happen, and feels helpless since s/he realizes that s/he cannot cause that targeted thing to happen. Since the addressee, as the person who will satisfy the addressor's desire, can cause the act of begging to happen and, since the addressor supposes that, his/her addressee does not want to perform it, the addressor adopts two tactics to gain what s/he is fervently desired and, for the first, s/he adopts a continual strategy of begging towards a person, an addressee, who is in a status or position to grant her/his desired act. Whilst secondly, s/he adopts the flatter strategy of addressee's sense, who can cause for me something either it is good or bad following his/her superiority over the addressor's inferiority.

The progressive theoretical scale, respectively here, is the analyzation which is outputted by Searle and Vanderveken (1985) and Vanderveken (1990), who are firstly showed several distinctions of how directive speech acts are worked by illocutionary logic and semantical tips. According to both versions (viz., 1985, 1990), their unified distinctions are worked as general parameters such as some performatives are ambiguously performed either they have different illocutionary point or imply only one point of illocutionary; some performatives are performed in public, and some in thought can be performed in soliloquy; some are collective intentionality performed; and so on. Searle and Vanderveken are logically classified begging speech act, within directives category, in accompanied with such acts, in a sub-category, as *"beg, supplicate, entreat, beseech, implore, and pray"* (1985, p. 204), whilst Vanderveken himself modernizes another new one to the sub-begging category as in *"beg, supplicate, beseech, implore, entreat, conjure, and pray"* (1990, p. 192). They (all of them) ultimately realize the particular features of the featured begging acts, as in the following:

- i-beg (they have) expressed a high degree of want-to*
- ii-beg (they have) represented a high degree of strength of illocution(ary) point*
- iii-beg (they have) expressed a high degree of [mitigation] more humbly*

Thus, in the pragmatic and cultural circularity, the addressor is concerned thoughtfulness of the effect through which s/he wishes to convey her/his targeted message, and what s/he is intended via begging speech act, is that the addressee can necessarily understand it.

#### **4. The Consummative Procedures of a Cognitive Begging Speech Act**

There are some sophisticated generalized overlaps into a cross-cultural pragmatic reconsideration of the speech act theory as well as its acts or forces in particular. Accordingly, the absence or lack of insistence does not sometimes mean foible of compliance with human purposes in a cognitive use and some types of the speech act Searlean categories, according to Dirven and Verspoor (2004), are closer to each other and can be grouped via subcategories to which similar principles may apply, for example, directives which impose some obligatory reactions, via some tactics and choices, on the addressee. These semi-contradictory matters, in addition to some others, yield the necessity of calling for an account of social variables which escort the achievement of speech acts as well as politeness issues since the illocution of begging act for example, according to Vanparys' (1996) explanation, cannot be inattentive one into an isomorphic accurately bounded, but most valid taxonomies may contain, with varying degrees of membership, overlapping categories and incomprehensible boundaries.

Since some layers of linguists have deemed contextual composition and its variable superimpositions to be chaotic, we observe that there are many approaches by others to improve the opposite. Ervin-Tripp (1996) and Van Dijk (2008) affirm on the contextual and variable rules which characterize and emphasize the social action role in the language in use and the idiosyncrasy of contextual boundaries at the study of the relationship between linguistics and philosophy in general, and the study of speech acts and its felicitous bits principally. These variables employ even the contrastive linguistic features and also support the structure of context as a guidepost for identifying what can probably be beyond the magical domain of variability in the context in use.

The instantiation of variables, strictly speaking, by Lakoff (1987) and Pérez's (2001) progressive explanations, hold for the propositions and characterization of these contextual bits, like the cornerstones of speech act theory, for instance, viz., the illocutionary force of begging as our targeted goal in this paper includes the values which taken on by the relevancy variables to its description firstly, and to its structure would compose the interplay among these different variables secondly.

The overlapping nature of the category of begging act will become more perspicuous in the ensuing description of the corresponding cognizance procedures, according to Leech (1980) and Pérez (2001), since the addressor will present himself as one of the latent assignees and the action is hereby expected to be beneficial to both the speaker and the addressee. Consequently, interlocutors in interaction should not be ennuied with overinformation, especially the addressee, according to Dirven and Verspoor (2004), who must deduce the communicative intentions and the extended information which are forcedly left in an implicit manner. The following are selected and related *hermeneutical* pragmatic views and examples:

*The Voice: Venus!... Venus!... O God with a throne made of gold studded with sapphires and turquoise, O the daughter of the Great Jupiter! O (you) who catered the call of your slaves and you are divided with your golden vehicle clouds of the sky, your vehicle which dragged by the two lithe curvaceous pelicans, smote with their gentle wings the waves of space... Venus heard my call (begged) and replied to my request! (Namely begged)... (Arabic Pygmalion<sup>4</sup>, 1942, Act I, p. 38).*

In this Arabic play instance, it is shown that *the real assignee of the business of begging*, is the addressee who does the role of achievement as in Leech's sentence "I beg you not to disclose my name" (1980, p. 99), and by the way, *it shares other directives like request, warn, advise, for a specific course of action*. Explicitly, the act of begging can be at a non-past time, while it exploits past and future channels of time (of deixis) for his superior or inferior addressor as the cognitive agent of the action. Under the assumption of capability, the voice of Pygmalion as the addressor who represents the cognitive beneficiary agent, as it is explained in above by Al-Sakkaki under the title of Trajectory of Begging and Latency of Directives, who pronounces the illocution of begging and works under his high motivation that the addressee, Venus, in the shadow, is capable of accomplishing the state of affairs which are declared before, according to Austin (1962), in the predication. The beneficiary cognitive agent must be the person whose project is inherently incomplete if the addressee, or (the agent who sometimes reflects a third person), is refused the compliance viz., Some cases of begging speech act have occurred after the refusing or semi-refusing request, invitation, suggestion, gaining promisory act, or accepting offers for addressor's honorable and moral benefit, and so on. The benefactor, Venus, respectively, must be the addressee who should be capable of holding out the targeted Pygmalion's action of replied, which is presented in the prediction. So, the example, "Please, let us finish my homework tonight," contains an incomplete action of an addressor until an addressee, as the real assignee, complies, according to his/her capability, for the addressor's begging. Furthermore, the two parties of a dialogue, viz., the addressor and the addressee, have taken very high interest from the oldest Arab linguists in general and Al-Jurjani and Al-Radhee in particular, via the intention and the purpose of speech at the addressor's aspect and the beneficiary or benefactor proposition of a specific begging act of speech at the addressee's reply to the targeted illocutionary act.

It is a consequence that the desire to do some state of affairs is exceptionally desired to the addressor especially, begging speech act, which depends on the addressee's parameters (Venus' abilities) of display the act of begging for resurrecting his statue. Since the action which the addressor has jailed the recipient, to do it, for elective consideration is fathomed as an advantageous act to the former, the addressee's enthusiasm (Venus' desire against Apollo's thought) to help or accomplish Pygmalion's begging action is as an expected action to be not high, under natural conditions. In another controversial example between the other two interlocutors are like in an inferior poorly girl says: "Please help me, Madam! You can help me!" Under an unexpected authority of Madam, in an unhumanized world (or community), may conditionally reply as an apt assignee as in "Yeah, without a doubt I'll help you dear if I can," since camaraderie, as it is elaborated by Lakoff (1975) and Márquez (2000), is the most poignant tool and by which the addressor can transpose the situation for his cultural pragmatic benefit. Thus, begging expressions which are used by the girl, example, represents her conduct as an eager to follow and hear some state of affairs or an unexpected behaviour which is ended by the addressee as a conditional promise with, if she can, Madam's mediocrity desire degree, since the default assumption, in an opposite situation, is overruled, as well as the expressions of begging speech act may display a lower degree of insistence by addressee who presupposes that she knows wherever she does not need to monopolize time and effort for an illusion economic situation.

Consequently, the addressor, in general, as explained by Al-Ddahi, will use the most persuasive devices like *crying, grievance, and victimize to others* to gain the strong will of the addressee's affirmative action. Another illustration is in the following exemplification and theorizing *hermeneuticians*:

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<sup>4</sup> Because the work of this paper used two different plays in two languages (viz., Arabic and English), with the same name (Pygmalion), I distinctively refer to either play with its native tongue.

*“Liza [crushed by superior strength and weight], what’s to become of me? What’s to become of me?”*  
*“Higgins. How the devil do I know what’s to become of you? What does it matter what becomes of you?”* (English Pygmalion<sup>5</sup>, 1975, Act IV, p. 75).

The *utility* of the resulted action of begging counts as an attempt by the addressor to influence the recipient’s expected reaction to the former’s advantage. The act of begging particularly (and of requesting act repeatedly), as it is potentially explained by Leech (1980), here should involve a beneficial result to the addressor (the poorer common girl), but it does not necessarily contain a negative attitude to the addressees (The flower-seller-girl’s *disbursement* as well as the people of her class, according to Pérez’s (2001) realization, shares with warning and threatening in a high degree of desirability on the one hand. Besides, the addressee here shares in *disbursement* and *utility* if he has done the targeted addressor’s propositional state of affairs) since the bringing about, in most cases, of the states of affairs as a specified actions some type of benefit for the addressor by the addressee who, on those occasions, performs that begged action as an assignee who will avail too.

Since speech is not a tonguing aspect that characterizes the call, the description and the detect the core of things, but it is, as shown by Al-Messawi (2011), the process of telecommunication and by with the universe is established and modernized its meaning. Meanwhile, speech is characterized by a verb since it is sophisticated and ramified at its trends and trajectories on the one hand, and it is connected to the phenomenon of humans and their nexuses to the world on the other hand. Therefore, Al-Messawi regards every speech is a verb wherein the verb is different from one field of expression to another according to the context of situation. Consequently, each utterance of speech has the value of verb which is part of that utterance, and this utterance’s value is closely connected to the verb which is related to before. Thus, the verbs of the speech act in general and begging speech act, in particular, cannot be constrained to specific zones and views, and therefore, the speech act of begging has deemed a part of used a speech as it is a part of social communication. Thus, when the addressor has his/her ability and desire, and the addressee has an apt way of communication, the context will be valuable.

However, Alexander (1967) shows, via an available elaborative narration, that it has been said that every person lives in this life by selling something, like teachers who live by selling knowledge, priests live by selling the comfort of spirituals, philosophers who live by giving wisdom, and so on. Even though it may be doable to measure the material goods’ value in terms of money, extremely, it is difficult to estimate the value of the actual services which people achieve for us. Alexander adds that the norms of (any) society are *“such that skills have to be paid for in the same way that goods are paid for at a shop”*. In another example by Pérez (2001), also, the young boy, whose name is James, says, to his daughter, Calera: *“I need you, I’m afraid.”* After he clutches at her arms like a child, he says: *“Don’t leave me, Calera. I want you to promise me that you won’t leave me.”* Thus, the young boy begs her daughter too much. Hence, the utility that the addressor believes he will realize, by the addressee, is significantly significant to him. Consequently, his wanting the addressee (Calera) to stay with him reflects James’ high degree of will to obtain the addressee’s overtly acceptance if the remaining action imposes an uninterested disbursement future bad results. Meanwhile, we can see, below, how another instance will embody begging speech act pragmatically:

*“Spintho, [groaning with horror] Oh, Lord! Can’t you stop talking about it? Isn’t it bad enough for us without that?”* (Androcles and the Lion, 1957, Act II, p. 127).

Both *power methodology and the style of formality* represent, as shown by Leech (1980), a peculiar type of begging achievement. The speech act of begging depends on the addressee “The Editor” who occupies the position of power and authority, which need not be institutional over the addressor “Spintho” who is in an inferior position. Charismatic power and superiority express the person (viz., the addressee) who can fulfill and endow, his addressor, the desires, and wishes that it has begged for. The above example of begging elucidates the displaying of another genius of authority *like physical and institutional one* (where the Editor sits on a chair, expressing his superiority, a little apart from them) over the addressor at a specific periodical time, viz., some cases of begging speech act are performed by those persons who are pessimistic and honored the others’ adjectives and activities. Under a formality level, which regards another aspect of begging achievement, the addressee’s power is here reflected an institutional aspect of performance of this act since the latter cognitive agent does not feel imposed to take into consideration the solicitation of the addressor who can limitedly use his mitigated devices in accordance with the high rate of the former’s optionality, i.e., formality, according to Lakoff (1975), as it is construed by Márquez (2000), represents one of the cross-cultural pragmatic rules which allow the addressors to determinate which utterances are responsory and which ones are deviant neither to a semantic nor to a syntactic problems, but they would be a pragmatic *hermeneutician*.

<sup>5</sup> It is Shaw’s play “Pygmalion”.

Regardless of the higher degree of the addressee's authority axiomatically results in the greater degree of the latter's freedom and optionality to comply or not to his interlocutor's begging, the addressor must negotiate in a high degree of *mitigation* for the accomplishment of his begging act (while he, viz., Spintho, who sits and confusingly clutches his head in his hands). Despite these addressee's devices of power and formality, the addressor, as it is explained by Al-Ddahi (2011), acts to do some manipulation social roles to make the addressee under his impact of manipulations, cornering his emotions and vectoring his predilections, all these tactics will be, via emotional maneuvers, viz., some cases of begging speech act are executed by the persons who want to gain some benefits by maneuverable tactics and circumventive ways. Therefore, the most significant parameter which brings the device of *mitigation* to the performance of begging is the intimacy methodology, which occurs between the addressees' decreases and participants' increases in the accomplishing ability of the targeted action. Another example of a young daughter who begs her unfamiliarity and alcoholic father says: "Please daddy, don't go to the pub over the road. Please, please," (Pérez 2001, p. 215). So, the daughter (viz., the addressor) in this dialogue has a reason to obtain the addressee's negative disposition (following her father's characteristics) toward her wishes. Since the father has an appropriate space of optionality, and also since the daughter knows that her father is not willing to cooperate, the latter tends to use the *mitigation* devices like 'please' as a way of persuading the former to adopt a cooperative way of compliance, i.e., it is very crucial to note that not all using of the word 'please' can successfully provoke the feelings of the addressee's compliance, but Sadock (1970, 1972) essentially shows, as it is mentioned by Horn and Ward's (2006, pp. 69-70) handbook of pragmatics, that such a word (viz., *please*) can commonly indicate the addressor's intention to produce a kind of effect which begging illocutionary act can typically do, i.e., one of the most influential tenets within *mitigation*, according to Lakoff (1975) and Márquez (2000), is the part which concerned deference between interlocutors to give their addressees enough amount of options.

Accordingly, the *closer of the social distance* is a doable device in an interactional variable exchange between the addressor and the addressee which make the latter compellable to help his addressor 'daughter' who represents the core of intimates and vice versa may not succeed with 'Spintho' and 'the editor of the gladiator' following aspect of formality. It is a consequence that the addressor is used the framing technique throughout the investment of some mutual-known purposes and devices between him and the addressees to exploit them, as in Al-Dahl's manipulations of pragmatics, for another purpose. Thus wise, the smaller of the *distance* socially between the interlocutors, makes the degree of the addressee's will probable to do and decreases the use of mitigation devices, whereas the use of mitigation in a farther social *distance* reflects the most influential tool for the utility of serving the desires at the addressor's prediction to reduce the optionality of the addressee. Therefore, the degree of optionality prototypically characterizes the category of begging. At the same time, when the addressor acknowledges the addressee's optionality and ability upon the situation as in the above dialogue of Androcles and the Lion, by Spintho, the addressor, via begging devices constitutes, attempts to constrain the initial high degree of addressee's freedom as a way of exploiting some mutual politeness conventions (that it will be discussed later on) to obtain the act of begging, not often, implicitly.

### **5. The Amalgamation of Begging Socio-Semantic and Syntactic Realizations**

In general, many speech acts like understanding commands, replying beg and request, asking questions, applying recommendations, issuing complaints, giving promise or comfort would, however, need the addressees' action, in the interpretation of their senses, to call for aid facts which pertaining certain mental experiences of these, exemplifiable, acts to stand for ethical dimension, and, also, to stand for their contextual similarities to the other which are required in accompanied with these acts' characteristics semantically.

On the other hand, Arabic pragmatics confirms, according to the explanations of Al-Jurjani, as shown by Sahraoui's (2005) book entitles 'Al-Tadawuleh Inda Al-Eulama Al-Arab: Dirasah Tadawuleh lizahirati Al-'Afeali Al-Kalamiati fi Al-Turath Al-Lesani Al-Arabi', that the nexus is so closed between grammar and semantics and the separation is disadvantaged to both of them. Moreover, Sahraoui interprets that Al-Jurjani adopted them (grammar and semantics for compositions) cognitively and executively at the same setting since the basic function of grammar, according to Al-Jurjani's versifying theory, is the highlighting of differences among the cross-cultural pragmatic levels of compositions in accordance with the versifying patterns which have been occurred in, as in the applicable proverb formula "For each context, its status," (2005, p. 221) since we extract that every speech either spoken or written is socio-pragmatics according to the primary conditions of cross-cultural dialogue.

Many, if not all, semanticists, according to Bierwisch's (1970) elucidation, as it is mentioned in Lyons' (1970) book, *hermeneutically* discuss the meaning of expression or act when it should undoubtedly concern the ways that the words, sentences or utterances are related, in the contextual world, to the objects and processes, on the one hand. While these

foregoing processes are related to one another, in a valuable connection, via terms of such notions *like synonymous, entailments, postulates, and contradictions, as well as some others else*, on the other hand, since illocutionary act, according to Vanderveken's (1990) view, is a very crucial process for the philosophical semantic purposes since it represents the principal units of meaning in the natural languages use and comprehension. Thus, the following featured tenets will be discussed pragmatically, since grammars, according to Lakoff's (1973) view and as shown by Márquez (2000, p. 7), should not only be specified to the applicable grammatical rules but should also involve semantic and pragmatic factors since the semantic-pragmatic ingredients are regarded elaborative parts at the linguist's responsibility like other parts of grammar, to maintain the equilibrium of *hermeneutician* of begging act since cross-cultural pragmatics, in the first instance, *hermeneutically* concerns with choices of using the language, and the reasons for those choices, as well as the effects which are conveyed throughout those choices; whereas semantics, in a *hermeneutical* sense, secondly represents, according to Crystal's (2017) statement, the way of conveyed meaning in a language, viz., everything can contribute to the meaning of spoken or written such as discourse (pragmatics, and semantics), tone, intonation, grammar, and so on; whilst syntax thirdly represents the main characteristics of grammar which *hermeneutically* reflects the way of meaning of words which are arranged within sentences via their technical terms, as hereunder:

**5.1-Throughout [begging and] directives, semantics matches grammar** since Al-Jurjani (2010) shows that syntax in the speech *likes the salt in the food*. However, there will not be any advantageous and felicitous in most regular speech semantically and pragmatically if there is not an appropriate adaptation to the grammatical rules and barriers alike. Brooks (2013, pp. 476-78) shows that begging act can be inevitably occurred in an active or passive potential mood, as in the following illustrative table:

**Table 1: Active and passive potential mood of begging speech act.**

Present Tense + Active Voice	
Singular	Plural
"I, You, He may/can/must beg."	"We, You, They may/can/must beg."
Past Tense + Active Voice	
Singular	Plural
"I, You, He might/could/would/should beg."	"We, You, They might/could/would/should beg."
Present Perfect Tense + Active Voice	
Singular	Plural
"I, You, He may/must have begged."	"We, You, They may/must have begged."
Past Perfect Tense + Active Voice	
Singular	Plural
"I, You, He might/could/would/should have begged."	"We, You, They might/could/would/should have begged."
Present Tense + Passive Voice	
Singular	Plural
"I, You, He may/can/must be begged."	"We, You, They may/can/must be begged."
Past Tense + Passive Voice	
Singular	Plural
"I, You, He might/could/would/should be begged."	"We, You, They might/could/would/should be begged."

Present Perfect Tense + Passive Voice	
Singular	Plural
“I, You, He may/must have been begged.”	“We, You, They may/must have been begged.”
Past Perfect Tense + Passive Voice	
Singular	Plural
“I, You, He might/could/would/should have been begged.”	“We, You, They might/could/would/should have been begged.”

It is a consequence that the speech act of begging occurs by adopting Leech’s (1980) view as a post-speech act (viz., it follows the event) where it is involved in the addressee’s mood of indicative passive. Meanwhile, this approach maintains Kempson’s (1977) view that the framework of the acts of speech, as in performatives, depends not on true/false assessment rather only on assessed as appropriate or inappropriate, which could be characterized in terms of the appropriate set of conditions required for their correct use as the process can be extended to manipulate utterances of acts of speech. Also, any performative spoken or written sentence may be pronounced appropriately as the act of begging when the addressor and the addressee’s relations coincide with the appropriate strategies on the (begging) act. Therefore, Austin, Searle, and Post-Austinian linguists and philosophers have turned to the speech acts’ account as the solution to the meaning’s problem (viz., pragmatic ambiguity). Accordingly, Wierzbicka also maintains the same viewpoints of the foregoing descriptions of the elaborations where the volition of the addressee of some precise speech acts such as begging performatively works in a transitive formula to get that the addressor considers, in the example, I beg Y to do Z, that Z is the addressee’s future action rather than it is the former’s future action. It is a consequence that the formula of begging act will elaborate that the addressor thinks when s/he begs Y (viz., the benefactor) to do Z that Y will do Z and when the addressor pronounces the act of begging of Z, s/he thinks that s/he pronounces the addressees will do it; therefore, the formula of begging will entail the precise reference at the addressee’s mind, viz., the assignee’s thought and will are like in the following description:

<p><i>X said this to Y:</i>  <i>this: you will do Z</i>  <i>because I want this:</i>  <i>‘I will do Z’</i>  <i>one could think at that time:</i>  <i>of this, Y will think this: ‘I will do Z’</i> (1988, p. 39).</p>	<p><i>I want</i>  <i>I say this</i>  <i>you will think this:</i>  <i>you will do it because of that</i>  <i>because</i></p>
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It is supposed, as it is explained by Fadhal (2015, pp. 167-8), that the addressor must take into consideration, at the deictic time of communication on the targeted information, the addressee’s status via made the latter in an adaptation case of the speech image; therefore, Fadhal may expositoryly refer to the three cases of the addressee, as in the following:

- First, when the addressee, in an uncomprehended mind, judges about the addressor’s propositions, primarily wherever the latter’s informing knowledge is delivered to the former without tools of confirmation. Therefore, this type has entitled the primary.*
- Second, when the addressee has hesitated at his/her ultimate judgment to the addressor’s proposition. Consequently, it is better to add, for more assurance, some acts or expressions for confirmation. Thus, this type is called the requestive.*
- Third, when the addressee is denied the addressor’s proposition; therefore, the addressor must assure the declarative use of the proposition with two confirmative expressions. Thus, this type is named deniable.*

Since each situation is constrained by social-semantic and syntactic norms and rules, the addressor ‘Liza’, in the following example, after highly professional practices with the professor of phonetics ‘Higgins’, leads a highly competent dialogue after a period of training her accent, begs as a begger not a beggar (both are requestive questions), as hereunder:

*Liza: I don’t want to hear anything more about that [period of training and after of it]<sup>6</sup>. All I want to know is whether anything belongs to me. My own clothes were burnt.*  
*Higgins: But what does it matter? Why need you start bothering about that in the middle of*

<sup>6</sup> Bracketed addition is mine.

*the night?*

*Liza: I want to know what I may take away with me. I don't want to be accused of stealing*  
(English Pygmalion, 1957, Act IV, p. 78).

In other words, those communicators (viz., Liza and Higgins) can usefully talk about words and sentences via a group of parameters or conditions than they communicate via meanings of words and sentences in a vacuum, viz., persons who do not know each other too much, but they belong to the same national community or cultural norms, as shown by Dirven and Verspoor (2004), may altogether share cross-cultural issues, about historical events, public figures, places, occasions, and so on, which are about our conventional relations or paradigms. However, Kempson appoints, to harness begging usefully, Chomskian concepts of competence and performance, i.e., Liza's progressive skills (1977, p. 54), on one hand, while, on the other, Austinian, Gricean, and Searlean concepts of indirect communication, i.e., Higgins' way of replying (ibid., p. 72).

**5.2-**Since the differences of structure and function are available, *begging bridges an explicit declarative instantiation*. Unlike other kinds of sentences, declarations as in the instance of the flower girl who is begged gentleman as he passes her *"Buy a flower, kind gentleman. I'm short for my lodging."* (English Pygmalion, 1957, Act I, p. 17) are the most unspecified manufactures of meanings of the targeted speech act. Most of the time, the embodiment of declarative, according to Pérez (2001) and Vanderveken (1990), represents a proposition in the realization of begging since these sentences are conventionally used to show how things are. Therefore, they are mostly compatible with the performance of the most acts of speech, not with begging act only (i.e., throughout these characteristics, the kind of declarative sentence would make those utterances generally form specialized use in expressing the precise sorts of them, like begging in particular). The conversational dialogue, by Pérez (2001, p. 210), between Cathy when she clutches at Madame Green's hand, after she enters the latter's house, as in *"Please, help me! You must help me!"* represents the process of informing the addressee. Moreover, detailed elucidation of Fadhil (2015, pp. 165-6) shows two purposes of informing the targeted message, to the addressee, as in the following:

*First, the advantage of telling has occurred where the addressor has a conscious intention to make his/her assignee (addressee) knows unknown information.*

*Second, the commitment advantageous, when the deliberate intention of the beneficiary cognitive agent (addressor), (in) voluntarily wants the assignee (benefactor) to know connotations of his/her declarative sentence.*

Therefore, in the foregoing examples, we observe that the 'you' grammatically reflects the second person singular pronoun whereby the new action is ready to start in a new multiplicate accomplishment of begging action. In addition, Quirk et al. (1985) show that begging belongs to the group of ditransitive verbs as in *"as – beg – decline – demand – offer – promise – refuse – swear – undertake – vow"*, rather than monotransitive, for instance, Catherine begs me to help. Both Quirk et al. (1985) and Brooks (2013) are concerned with categorized begging act grammatically. The detail of begging verb, under the group of the indicative mood, by Brooks (2013, p. 475), is as in the following table:

**Table 2: Indicative mood of begging speech act.**

Singular		Plural	
"I beg, You beg, He/she/it begs"		"We beg, You beg, They beg"	
Singular		Plural	
"I begged, You begged, He/she/it begged"		"We begged, You begged, They begged"	
Singular		Plural	

"I shall beg, You will beg, He/she/it will beg"	"We shall beg, You will beg, They will beg"
Present Tense	
Singular	
"I have begged, You have begged, He has begged"	"We have begged, You have begged, They have begged"
Present Perfect Tense	
Singular	
"I had begged, You had begged, He had begged"	"We had begged, You had begged, They had begged"
Past Tense	
Singular	
"I'll have begged, You'll have begged, He'll have begged"	"We'll have begged, You'll have begged, They'll have begged"
Future Perfect Tense	

Much more is involved when Quirk et al. (1985, p. 1212-13) show that begging is followed by preposition 'of' plus that-clause in a formal situation, for instance, "I begged of you that you will keep this secret", and it is used in a usual case as in "I begged her to help". Syntactically, the subject represents the addressor, whereas the object represents the addressee, in an active voice. Throughout the second person pronoun, the act of begging bridges the modal auxiliary verb 'must' as a kind of obligation operator, in which the addressor Cathy is powerless in her nexus to the addressee, and the beggar (viz., Cathy and the flower girl), cannot, in this way, have the ability to use the expression of imposition via the modal verb 'must' that exists ostensibly at a deontic objective mood, declarative function, and imperative form to get what it is strongly desired to have.

5.3-Begging act is concerned with the question of the imperative use via the activation of the most significant consummative aspects of begging, whereby the addressee will react to the addressor's act, the cognitive agent's role, the action of the targeted illocution which mostly work to perform in the future. Unlike the view of Wierzbicka (2003, p. 32) who shows throughout the featured definition of request that, in general, "If the speaker wants to get the addressee to do something and does not assume that he could force the addressee to do it, the speaker would normally not use a bare imperative. Speech acts which could be reported utilizing the verbs request or ask (to) frequently have an interrogative," begging speech act, as a main component of the directive-requestive hierarchical acts, is admitted speech act, unlike request which is not admitted speech act, and therefore the addressor, who begs for some beneficiary thing, can use imperative mood. Likewise, to my consideration, Brooks (2013, p. 477) shows the categorization of begging in the active imperative mood as in the following:

Table 3: Imperative mood of begging speech act.

Imperative mood	
Singular	Plural
"beg or beg you"	"beg or beg you"
Present tense	
Present	Present Perfect
"To beg"	"To have begged"

Present	Past	Perfect
"begging"	"begged"	"have begged"

Otherwise, the formula of will is deemed high at the addressor's nature, who begs the addressee to carry out his/her wishes, even if the accomplishment time, of begging act, will perform later on. In the conversational exchanges, by Pérez (2001, p. 224), as in *"Oh no, Lord, please, don't let this go weird,"* and in another instance, begging will be done in the imperative functional use as in *"Please, cross, in the name of God,"* the bagger completes, *"Be gentle with Myrtle. She has been waiting on me night and day. She's all I got. Don't insult her."* An illustrative example of a mitigated begging act is in the following:

*"Androcles [barring the way back] No, dearie: don't take on like that. We can't go back. Wave sold everything: we should starve; and I should be sent to Rome and thrown to the lions."* (Androcles and the Lion, 1957, Prologue, pp. 105-6).

It is clear from the above instances that the sublimity of the addressee, on the one hand, is intersected with the mixture use of the explicit mitigated devices of the adverbial vehicle 'please' where it is preceded by the formal entitlement 'Lord' in the first epitome. Also, the negative case coincides with the strong will of the addressor. On the other hand, the second epitome represents, by conventions of politeness, the emphasis of how the addressor needs to carry out the state of affairs throughout the *mitigation* (viz., mutual and plural) tools potential enquires. Thus, we agree with Wierzbicka (2003, p. 34) about her logic parameter to perform our targeted speech act as in *"one could perform requests, [or acts closely related to requests]<sup>7</sup>, by ostensibly asking about the addressee's ability to do something, or about his or her goodness"*.

In other words, powerless desires of the addressor to achieve his goals (and one of the most interesting aspects of politeness), according to Eelen (2001), is the politeness when it is located at the intersection space of language and social reality as in *"Don't leave me here, I beg of you!"* (OAL'sD<sup>8</sup>, 2005, p. 125). While, the addressor, who is the little begger man, begs her wife 'Megaera' sincerely to get the way of peace with him as well as others of escapers. The ridiculous man begs Megaera the merciful and safeness not only for himself but for her and followers alike since the people of his community are suffered and hurt from their community norms. Thus, this imperative sentence, according to Vanderveken's (1990) views, is attempted to get the addressee to do the act of begging and, the addressor, as shown by abu al-Edous (2007), begs the addressee via [implicit (and explicit) begging] as a one aspect of the multiple uses of imperative sentence. It is a consequence that the addressor somehow needs to make the addressee carry out the cooperative action, not by impositive tactics, but across some persuasive and begging strategies.

**5.4-Begging abides interrogative uses**, as its based realization and overwhelming majority agents' actions (have elected the use of the interrogatives), are absolutely not causelessly. Also, interrogative concept, according to Al-Awsi's explanation, is meant the demand to get the imaging result of begging at the addressee's mind since the demand of something in accordance with Al-Sakkaki's (1937) elaborations, as cited in Al-Awasi (1988, p. 311), is regarded that the questioning about something is demanded about that thing and, the demand here is the targeted interest of the addressee's preparatory understood. For begging elaborations, Shaw's (1957) *Pygmalion* culturally embodies the struggle of classes as in the following:

*The flower girl: ...Now you know, don't you? I'm come to have lessons, I am. And to pay for for...*

*Higgins: Well!!! [Recovering his breath with a gasp] What do you expect me to say to you?*

*The flower girl: Well, if you was a gentleman, you might ask me to sit down, I think. Don't I tell you I'm bringing your business?*

*Higgins: Pickering: Shall we ask this baggage to sit down, or shall we throw her out of the window?*

*The flower girl: [running away in terror to the piano, where she turns at bay] Ah-ah-oh-ow-ow-ow-oo! [Wounded and whimpering] I won't be called a baggage when I've offered to pay like any lady.*

*Pickering: [gently] But what is it you want?*

<sup>7</sup> Square brackets are added here to emphasis the precise within information.

<sup>8</sup> Stands for "Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary".

*The flower girl: I want to be a lady in a flower shop stead of selling at the corner of Tottenham Court Road. But they won't take me unless I can talk more genteel. He said he could teach me. Well, here I am ready to pay him-not asking any favor-and he treats me if I was dirt. (English Pygmalion, 1957, Act II, p. 23).*

In an unequivocal dialogue of the above play's characters, the utterance's force can be realized by the addressee who is firstly made unaware turning, later on, to an aware consciously, to what has been achieved under certain evolved latter's response (viz., some cases of begging speech act are produced by persons who are racialized ingrainedly), especially at the upper-lower classes struggles, i.e., the upper-class is concerned with civilized society to maintain a social hierarchy and mutual obligations on the one hand, and also to maintain an interpersonal nexuses equipoise within a social group, on the other hand.

Likewise, the force of the act of begging is ultimately related to the intention, which must be understood by the assignee to be performed correctly. Thus, it is obvious that the flower girl (as the addressor), in begging, does not need to evoke her authority over the assignee (Higgins) who has the complete capacity, over the former, to perform the action, since the interrogative sentence here, as it is affirmed by Vanderveken (1990), is used to ask a question about begging act. So, Pérez (2001) shows that the interrogative sentences are the purest ones which are capable of instantiating the optionality feature of begging' realization that the addressor needs to decrease his/her mitigation devices.

**5.5-Begging act is, as a direct controlling device and as an exclamatory tactic,** consequently meant that the expressions of begging would be characterized by various mixtures of procedures of directives' realization. Likewise, Wierzbicka maintains that if we compare speech acts from different languages, we need to present their meanings as configurations "of a small number of simple components," not as configurations "of a larger number of components some of which would necessarily be quite complex" (1992, p. 16). So, reconsider the different uses of fulfillment imploring devices may represent the most important functions to facilitate the cooperation among society members' individuals or groups since this sentence type, as in Vanderveken's (1990) viewpoints, is used to express the addressor's mental state. Therefore, Leech (1974) shows that the semantic competence harnesses of various social needs to involve moral questions, strategies of propaganda, and exploitations of language, in general, are, as in Al-Hakeem's epitome hereunder:

*Venus: (politely)... Pygmalion...! What does he want this artist?*

*Pygmalion: (far away) Venus!... Venus!... O you are bright among goddesses... O you are glowed the lights in the hearts of people by your luminous fingers... Listen to me please (my beg)!*

*Venus: (kindly) I've listened... What does he want Pygmalion?*

*Apollo: (Malevolence) Lo!... I'm seen that your encomium to you immediately blot out your exasperations on him!*

*Venus: A man is begged my auspices! ... (Arabic Pygmalion, 1942, Act I, p. 39).*

Thus, the function of the speech act of begging influences others' attitudes and behavior and puts specific social controls with emphasis on the addressee's result rather than on the addressor's one of the messages. In Arabic grammar, Syybiwiyah and Al-Zamkhshari are shown, as cited in Al-Awsi (1988, pp. 263-5), that [O...] is used for more demanding confirmation. In this assurance way, the act of address graduates from ambiguous state to directness one. Furthermore, in English and Arabic societies alike, begging may depend on the addressor's appropriate circumstances as well as various options, in certain situations, but the degree of politeness can be, via the degree of optionality to the assignee's status, the way of preparing for the performance of begging cooperatively. Besides, politeness, as shown by Eelen (2001), manifests itself, functionally, in any sensible form of behavior and even, also, in the absence of behavior. Therefore, the scope of politeness can stretch well beyond purely verbal choices to contain the entire spectrum of action.

## **6. The Correlation of Begging's and Conventions of Politeness: the anecdotal congestion**

A language in general, according to Halliday an (2003) lucidity, is the potentiality in processes, whereby sets of alternatives in meaning are available to both the addressor and the addressee alike. It is important to clarify that these alternative sets refer, sometimes not directly, to codes in the linguistic system, phonology, grammar, semantics, and others, as a range of strategies which are tagging along with tactics in use pragmatically. On the other hand, these sets of options represent the encoding of the input towards the linguistic system for decoding the range of multi-uses in a language. No matter, what does the addressor mean can be regarded primarily as a strategy for entering the language system, while it is secondarily shown a form of the realization of a namely potential behavior [from what can the cognitive agent mean is as one form, towards, of

what can the assignee do], wherein that behavioral potentiality can be savvied not only by the medium of the language system but also by other means of behavior strategies *like the diverse parameters of politeness as well as other means of language users.*

So, by taking features (in a language) that are simple and straightforwardly encoded in one language or culture, one may sometimes obtain the likewise encoded features in less visible ways in another language or culture as in polite beg *"I beg your pardon, I thought that was my coat"* (OAL'sD, 2005, p. 126). Therefore, Levinson (1983, p. 43) shows that there are levels of respect, following grammaticalization, which express the options in use of expressions as in *"I wondered if I could see you for a moment, [Please. Please!]"* It is a consequence that such encoded characteristics of context, inside our world's languages have relevant functions and constraints, about these forms and options, on a relatively vacuous attending the politest beg to the requested world via the various procedures of demanding in general.

However, the distinctions of politeness strategies tectonically assorted by many authors who are mixed, with their views, many ideas *like psych-conduct-polite, socio-users-polite, cognitive-mind-and polite-usage, semantic-respect-expressions, linguistic-begging-and polite means, and so on.* One of the most significant integrated points that our approach here pinpoints is the integrated connection of polite-less/ness to culture-less/ness, especially in the case of begging (that it will be explained hereunder and at the bellowing subsections, too) wherein the interactants perform their input and output meanings simultaneously. Thus, the addressor needs to activate the politeness means or options culturally in gaining the acceptance of the addressee who wants to fulfill his/her begging acts or desires (thought and intention). Also, Yang (1945) shows, according to some cultural assumptions, that there are seven factors involved in what the cognitive agent constitutes a gain or loss of the face. These factors, as it is mentioned by Hinze (2012, p. 17), can be concerned as potential parameters, as in the following:

- i-Equality of position,*
- ii-Social status inequality,*
- iii-The presence of a witness,*
- iv-Social relationships,*
- v-Social value or sanction,*
- vi-Consciousness of the addressor's (and the addressee's) social prestige,*
- vii-Age.*

Likewise, Brown and Levinson (1987) list, under the title of cultural notions of face, two kinds of face-wants or desires in a performative interaction, as hereunder:

*Firstly, positive (cross-cultural pragmatic) face is concerned with higher performative actions which elaborate the solidarity, preference, deference, and honor of face-saving of the agent's action towards the other, and secondly, negative (cross-cultural pragmatic) face is dealt with freedom of actions and freedom from impositions when the addressor realizes and respects the addressee's negative desire and will minimally interface with addressee's multiple choices of action.*

Otherwise, the addressor may not be the politest, in some ways, to the range, by which s/he can reduce the addressee's risk or cost when the latter performs his begging act. The generalize polite-culture parameters are as in the following:

**6.1-Indirectional impact** refers to the sets of strategies when the speech act of begging communicates more than what its sentences' meanings mean or what its encounter-meanings perform or do. We culturally sometimes intend to manipulate communicative tactics of begging act throughout contextual situation and utilizing accomplishing that act communicatively, as in the dialogical conversation between a student who comes from another school and attends to a class recently and his of some bully colleagues in their spare time inside the room of the class which are arrogantly enjoyed; therefore, he is innocently said, *"Can you reduce the speed of the ventilator, please. Please!"* It is a consequence that that coming student recently seems unfamiliar with those bullies' harsh activities, and he, by the way, wants to share, knowledge, something with them to reduce the furthest negative effect on him. Accordingly, he begs them and at this tactics, beg act passes through threatening act to avoid costly action and then to gain his desire, on the one hand, and since he is influenza and fever patient, he wants to be in-group politely and gains his health ultimately, viz., some cases of begging speech act are performed by the poorest patients toward their best doctors. Many languages, *like English and Arabic,* offers, for the achievement some costly acts *like begging, for example,* a remarkable number of conventional and nonconventional indirect expressions plus

politeness kinds of behavior are employed to preserve the addressor's face, which depends on his/her high will and to minimize the result of the refusing action indirectly.

*Pygmalion: O my dearest Jalayta ... I beg you... I beg you to be careful with each cilium of your cilia... Everything of you is precious...(Arabic Pygmalion, 1942, Act I, p. 60).*

In a historical story, in the Greece-goddess era, there is a skillful sculptor who lives alone in an ideal life with his statues. One day, when burning incense in the fires of a big traditional celebration, the sculptor (Pygmalion) begs the goddess of love 'Venus' for giving his statue the life. After Venus replies his begging, a cross-cultural pragmatic dialogue between him and Jalayta takes place. At that (un)conscious dialogue, Pygmalion begs his lifelike lover to stop blaming him, to stop crying, to stop doubting him since the notion of face, according to Brown and Levinson (1987), links up naturally and culturally to some of the most fundamental ideas of the social persona, shame and redemption, honor, and virtue as well as religious concepts. Accordingly, Al-Hashimi (2010) here shows that the declarative of implicit begging is used to convey the purpose of fear from losing an important thing. Beyond what is already stated, begging verb is projected as 'a suasive verb' about the directive category, as shown by Quirk et al. (1985) and Leech et al. (2009, p. 1187) who are claimed that it is difficult to make a subdivision, of suasive verbs, between public and private verbs. Therefore, these verbs are usefully distinguished into indirect public directives and individual volition states, as in the following:

*"Ask – beg – desire – intend – pledge – request – vote".*

Accordingly, the speech act of begging can reflect the two subcategorized meanings alike since it sometimes works publically *as in the roles of some groups or organizations or privately as in an interpersonal deed*. Besides, the addressor and the addressee, according to Akmajian et al. (1995) views, share some tackled strategies since the addressor knows, to gain his begging act, that indirectional impact will be appropriate contextually for the assignee who will ultimately recognize what the addressor is communicated indirectly.

**6.2-Saussure (1959)** shows that with very respect to thought, the characteristic function of language is to serve as an essential link, under necessity conditions of bringing about the mutual delimitations of sensible units, between thought and sound for expressing ideas. Accordingly, our targeted language should preferably compare with a sheet of paper since the axis of thought represent the front while the sound axis reflects the back, and the cognitive agent's message cannot cut the front without doing the process of cut to the back simultaneously. In other words, one cannot divide sound from thought and vice versa since the division process could be abstractedly performed, and the result would be inevitably either pure phonology or psychology. Thus, *tone-pressure impact* deems one of the most obtaining axes of the act of begging. Accordingly, a stronger echelon of persuasion is used to identify tone device, on the part of the addressor, to agitate the interlocutor's readiness and gain the response, from him, in the end, as in the following example:

*The flower girl: [Taking advantage of the military gentleman's proximity to establish friendly relations with him] If it's worse, it's a sign it's nearly over. So cheer up, Captain; and buy a flower off a poor girl.*

*The gentleman. I'm sorry. I haven't any change.*

*The flower girl: I can give you change, Captain.*

*The gentleman: For a sovereign? I've nothing less.*

*The flower girl: Gran! Oh, do buy a flower off me, Captain. I can change half-a-crown. Take this for tuppence (English Pygmalion, 1957, Act I, p. 10).*

It is noted that the flower girl begs the captain in an impacted tone of a low voice. Also, some cases of begging speech act are achieved by those persons who are doing some jokings and street-cirque by jesters as well as the act of begging, which is done by those persons who are distant acquaintances. Therefore, the impact of tone, especially in begging, may make the addressor appreciate the high degree of superiority and intentionality of the assignee's positive achievement of the action. So, attitudinal behavior, emotional aspect, and memorial situations are not fluctuated in compared with addressor's tone of manipulative impact in most of the verbal communication since emotions, as shown by Wierzbicka (1999), need to be studied cross-culturally and pragmatically since it is communicated and expressed at every level of language either via grammar and intonation or it is expressed in facial gestures like the raised eyebrows, the move of forehead or frowns' features or via bodily marks such as the move of neck or foot-stamping. Thus, begging-emotions are inevitably represented the key-combination of yearning for the missing or paucity of some-thing/one.

Strictly speaking, the conversation of the situation of the speech act of begging presupposes that there is a primary utterance that somehow represents a metaphorical schema of noises that fulfills certain grammatical structures and semantic vehicles to conveyance the multiplicities of those schemas from locutionary case to illocutionary force via intonation. Since the

exploitation of things to fit the words depends on the intonation axis, most of the above-mentioned writers affirm that the addressees as the assignees' action (for their addressors), in performing begging act, are accompanied with container-schema of all the implications that their humans plus their dimensions in a social zone may opt for carrying out the successful communicative event, rather than they are a mere dispatchers of the resulted actions and receivers of the targeted message since communication, as shown by Bara (2010), is potentially a cooperative activity, occurs between two or more people, in which the meanings of each deal, are constructed by those interlocutors, together, engaged in the shared task of reciprocal attending to the other communicants' words. The addressor is aware, in the stance which starts when a Somali patient of cancer starts a dialogue with a therapist governmental doctor before the latter's decision of letting the former remain (or not) in the hospital for chemotherapy: *"Please, please, Doctor, help me."* Then the patient begged and cried of pain: *"Please, let me take the first dosage, Dr. X."* Throughout begging the conversation, it is obvious how the economic status of Somalia's government and awesome suffering of the Somalian hospitals of therapies destitution pragmatically work.

However, the low will degree on the part of the addressee's anticipation, as shown by Pérez (2001), may explain to the reader why the addressor or the patient decides to use declarative sentences at first before he turns his begging to the imperative formula. Moreover, the use of the mitigation and iteration devices on the addressor's part, along with his heartache voice, may construe the many changed states of affairs on the cognitive agent's action part. Thus, according to Al-Mutawakel's (2011) elicitation, the meaning of requestive verbs in general and begging speech act, in particular, may imply another meaning if they are devolved and exploited out of their original explicit space as in the case of interrogative which may generate begging and vice versa.

**6.3-Iteration impact**, here, is influential, especially when the addressor predominately realizes the addressee's (positive) disposition, and the ensuring of the act of begging is more insistent with the iterated strategy. Performatively, iteration means computing the process of iteration via the same addressor's settings to perform begging action in a set or on the outcomes of each ingredient's prior action. In a transitive condition, the addressor iterates his wants in second or many times. In the same situation, Tannen (2007) shows that repetition in dialogue is reflected in a powerful musical effect. It focuses on the variation of clauses, phrases, words, and briefer reference to phonology and prosody. When it discusses the dialogue in conversation, iteration can concern with the analytical implications since it represents the core of how the discussion in discourse itself is precisely created and of how a precise dialogue is created commonly. Since the significance of iteration for the understanding of how pragmatic language works is to create the precise meaning, of begging speech act for instance and negotiate nexuses, Tannen respectively adds that there are four major categories which *hermeneutically* serve the varied purposes of the iteration in conversation, as the hereunder explanation:

*i-Throughout production, iteration enables the addressor to produce language in a more efficient, 'less energy-draining way' since iteration represents a source for creating ample talk both by supplying material for discussion via enabling negotiation through automaticity.*

*Thus, it allows the cognitive agent of begging act to produce fluent speech while constituting what to say next.*

*ii-Throughout the redundancy of the spoken iteration dialogue, which allows the addressee receiving, begging, information that the addressor is produced it roughly, iteration facilitates comprehending variations in a less new dense semantic dialogue if all the uttered words are carried new information. Thus, the cognitive agent of begging act benefits from some relatively perished space while thinking of the following thing to say. Meanwhile, the addressee avails from the same perished space while s/he is absorbed into what is said at the addressor's redundant speech.*

*iii-Throughout the connectedness, iteration shows how ideas presented in the dialogue are harmonized to each other, to fulfill Halliday and Hassan's (1976) classification of cohesion, as well as the linked of new utterance to earlier dialogue. Thus, iteration allows the addressor to shape his/her material by providing pieces of evidence for the latter's attitudes to show how the addressor's iterations contribute to the meaning of discourse.*

*iv-Throughout interactional level, iteration creates meanings in conversation via performing social goals and managing the business of the dialogue. Thus, iteration here maintains the relationships not only between parts of speech of dialogue, but it enhances the addressor and the addressee's bonds in a conversation individually and in general nexuses publically.*

Meanwhile, the obvious advantage particularizes the conceptualization of force instead of action as the causal and interactional aspects of speech act broadly, and of illocutionary act like begging via the iteration and mitigation tools of

communication precisely. In the example of the Asian woman who sees off her son to study in England, said: *"Oh, please my son X, don't let me alone. Don't go far away. Please, do not go to England."* This example consequently elaborates, on these occasions, the conceptualization of the speech act of begging, which is closely linked to the force of iteration inside the mediocrity of mitigation. Begging is, strictly speaking, concerned, according to Pérez's (2001) foregoing explanations alike, unlike other kinds of speech acts in general and of directives in particular, with the degree to which the desires of the addressor represent the highest one which whereby carried out after they are settled morally as in OAL'sD (2005, p. 126) example when someone obliges to ask repeated the other after the other's replying him primarily, *"It's on Duke Street. / I beg your pardon. / Duke Street."* Thus, the addressee has the only optional ways of achievement as the hereunder dialogue between Androcles and Megaera. The former addressor beggingly looks thin, small and starved when he carries a big bundle, whereas his wife, is at the prime of her life, seems handsome pampered slattern when she has nothing to carry except a stout stick. Quotably, Androcles is said:

*Androcles: [pleading wearily] Oh, not gain, dear. What's the good of stopping every two miles and saying you won't go another step? We must get on to the next village before night. There are wild beasts in this wood: lions, they say (Androcles and the lion, 1957, p. 103).*

According to the above dialoguing words, it can elaborate that the iteration can be done too by the iterating of the same begging (or pleading) question via multiple synonyms words via some polite explanations to appeal to the assignee in face-to-face interaction. Publically, the use of iteration strategy helps to conquer the lack of the assignees' readiness to endow the addressors' want, and by the way, to vitalize the politeness' conventions culturally. Elsewise, Al-Abd (2011) logically shows that the iteration is an important rhetoric device which has been used, by the addressor, to enforce the performative utterance of begging since the iteration is well-decoded for both codes, viz., spoken and written alike, even though that the spoken impact of iteration is stronger than the other. Thus, we observe that the rationale use of iteration makes the degree of addressors' will very high and explicit openly. Hence, people who are the real cognitive agents' action, via the conventions of politeness, are expected to change their negative evaluations which affect others, and the result will be a natural thing that the high desires of others to hold these states of affairs also change (and if they refuse to grant their addressors' wishes, the formers' works will be peccadillo socially and ritualistically) in accordance with cultural tenets.

**6.4-Acknowledging the other's superiority impact** which concerns at first with the authority which involved in the accomplishment of the first reply of the addressee, as the real assignee of the action, towards the addressor who needs to arise the positive requirement of achievement as in the following:

*The flower girl: "Poor girl! Hard enough for her to live without being worried and chivied." (English Pygmalion, 1957, Act I, p. 15)*

In other words, the corporeal or incorporeal power of the addressee over the addressor can keep the former's performance and optionality at the same time. Likewise, Gordon and Lakoff (1971) show, as cited in Horn and Ward (2006, p. 69), that the high degree of accomplishing precise kind of speech act (*like begging speech act*) is represented the result of systematicity which is concerned with apparent content of the targeted utterance. The strategy, they add, is adopted the impact of that kind or targeted illocutionary effect, via a *hermeneutical* process here, to assert the role of the sincere addressor or to question the sincere addressee which is governing that sort of illocutionary speech act since the addressor is based on his high desire to perform the act, on the one hand, and on his believing that his addressee is able to carry out the action. In the Arabic conversational dialogue, which occurs between an old man and a lawyer, where the former holds on the latter's hands and begs him for his prisoner 'son'. Meanwhile, he starts his speech as in the following:

*The Father: Please, Mr. X, my son, is accused of pilfering.*

*The father is begging: Please, only you, Mr. X, can save him.*

*The father is reluctantly begging: You can be sure that I'll do anything for your work.*

It is a consequence that there is a performative sort of authority where the addressor acknowledges the addressee's superiority over him (viz., some cases of begging speech act are produced by prisoners towards their jailors). Consequently, the latter's authority reflects the necessary power to execute the former's son, therefore, we can guess, according to the old man's lower level bargain via bestowing everything that the lawyer wants, plus the high will (of the former) via holding the hands of the lawyer, that begging speech act pragmatically and politely can be done. So, the addressor, as it is maintained by Al-Zuhairy (2011), begs the addressee via some expressions and/or deeds, *as in the case of the lawyer and the old man*, to pay the assignee knows what the addressor wants to do.

**6.5-Environmental impact** concerns the ecological, social, situational, psychological, and several essential entities that make the interaction between the addressor and the addressee (or the assignee), an appropriate and probable accompanied with conventions of politeness. Both the assignees and their environments are prevalently represented the core of illocutionary forces' work since they compel the contextual situation to devote an apt account of the attention towards the whole range of optionality. Many linguists and philosophers affirm that there is an image-schema to define a set of propositional, conceptual, metaphysical, and mental entities which emanate from our physical understandings and experiences to meet the interaction of the whole environment, on the one hand, and it sometimes creates a reference to the linguistic society in general, or the circle of social or family in particular, on the other hand. Ergo, it represents a strong case through which many societies can be understood across their contextual environment. In the example of, I'm frankly not know how to get the key. Please, Mrs. Lora, help me. It seems like a different world. "Please, Mrs., let me know the way at least," we observe that granted that human beings obtained as containers where they interact with each other inside the biggest (environmental containers) one to lead us to the following. Theorizing beg of the following example highlights on the compensatory power within politeness exchange circle as in:

*Liza: [To Pickering, taking no apparent notice of Higgins, and working away defily] Will you drop me altogether now that the experiment is over, Colonel Pickering?*  
*Pickering: Oh, don't. You mustn't think of it as an experiment. It shocks me somehow.*(English Pygmalion, 1957, Act II, p. 92)

However, the consequence of the politeness account may be, via empirical process of beg as in the dialogue which occurs between Colonel Pickering, who helps Doolittle twice—firstly when he calls her a 'Miss Doolittle' the thing that she is not used to at London's streets when she sells flowers, whilst he secondly shares the professor Higgins in his experiment in phonetics when the latter teaches Liza to speak like a duchess (whilst she is reflected a lower-class flowers selling in streets). In other words, the Polite bargain, as shown by Goffman (1967), is mostly preserved, and the interlocutors who have a real disagreement with another will attempt to communicate via temporary lip service, to interpretations. This procedure will bring them into a preliminary agreement, at least on facts and principles, by adapting rules of smoothing out of transition at their precise dialogue. Therefore, Liza psychologically dialogues the Colonel via a posteriori channel of future compensation (viz., reward doctrine), and hence the assignee will socially and situationally opt the addressor wishes and carries the costly acts of begging under illocution scrutiny coming to the whole logical environmental conclusion of environmental embodiment since Al-Najar (2011) maintains what does Al-Jurjani assure that there is a type of speech cannot reach to its meaning via the reference of its utterance only since that utterance will guide to its meaning in linguistics and there is another reference will guide us to the (cross-cultural) pragmatic meaning of that utterance too.

## **7. Convergence, Interpersonal, and Impersonal: An Amount of cultural Communication**

Communication of realistic begging is a macro-function of negotiation and a micro-function of convergence. Communication, therefore, as Widdowson's (2007) precise illumination, is a matter of some negotiating kind of common (dis)agreement in an interaction between the parties, then, the first person, the addressor formulates the message of begging by drawing on a mental construct of granted assumptions about how does the sender's intended sense relate to the world, that s/he lives in, where an ideational schema, viz., it reflects how reality is ordered, unified with an interpersonal schema, viz., it appears how a precise communication is managed, in the knowledge of schemata (singular schema) that are operative with a specific society of language communicators, on the one hand. The need for knowledge of encoded semantic, in a particular community to solidify schematic knowledge pragmatically, systemic knowledge, on the other hand, represents an encoded knowledge of that community's language system. Furthermore, a similar knowledge brings by the second person, the addressee, to bear begging coded message in an interpretation.

The conscious elucidation between knowledge and behavior, which is abovementioned, is closely related to the context, according to Pribram's (1976) view, which shows that consciousness is primarily related to the brain use as well as it is involved to the identification of self. For achieving consciousness, it is necessary to activate the property of performing a special relationship between organisms and their environment, under the macro sense of behavior, since consciousness and brain are closely interwoven via the codes of behavior. Thus, the basic use of the brain is to create the codes (or information) and by which organisms are communicated. In other words, the interlocutors (via., especially organisms) consciously establish special nexuses with their environment (viz., language, behavior, and culture). Therefore, it can be potentially extracted, by their views that the essential core function of those interlocutors' intellectual capacity is to produce information for communication via the generation of conscious codes. Inevitably, these codes are languages in use, while the languages represent the key to the consciousness structure.

Likewise, Searle (2010) deals with language naturalistically as a basic biological extension and prelinguistic intentional forms to meet interlocutors' requirements via a natural outgrowth of their physical, chemical, and biological fundamentals. Functionally, Halliday also maintains that the meaning, which is the outputs of communicated interlocutors, is closely constituted the system of information, viz., language, and culture are to be localized as an interface between those interlocutor's reference and their codes. Since the power of language is stabled contextually in the act of meaning, Halliday observes that there are reasons and *hermeneuticians* "for wanting [or begging] to gain some insight into how language is used" (2003, p. 298, my bracketed italics). Moreover, Halliday refers to the macro-functions of use of language for social purposes, as in the following:

*i-Ideational (cultural) pragmatic use, in a more general sense, tends to inform of how one use of language in use, and then leads, the cognitive agent's action, to think of it in terms of its capacity to inform, via the latter's experience about the potential content and of the speech community.*

*ii-Interpersonal (cultural) pragmatic use tends to inform of how one use of language in use socially and personally, and also embodies all the cognitive agent's (or addressor's beg) uses and the addressee's choices into the speech act and situation.*

*iii-Textual (cultural) pragmatic use tends to fulfill the relative operational requirements, in a real context of the situation, via the living space or message, where the remaining potential meaning in a fabric linguistic structure is woven.*

However, codes of begging messages, which are conveyed by the addressor, to the assignee, can be *hermeneutically* referred via some agreements or various disparity of wide generalizations and discussions like Crystal (2006), Al-Sulaimaan (2010), and others. These elaborated tactics reflect images of an expansion of language, or they can be on facial expression, wink, cry, gestures, ragged clothes, hand movement, plead as non-linguistic notions. Those utterances of begging can be performative and communicative acts only if they are used under the following parameters in general, as in the following:

**7.1-**Where communicative events theoretically take place, *many language features converge directly or indirectly* with circumstances of the speech act of begging.

**7.2-**The *time and the place* in which that performative-communicative begging act occurs such as *at the funeral ceremonies, in church, near the institutional gate, or upon leave-taking, companions of the surgical patient in a hall waiting* as in patient and doctor-secretary dialogue: "Can you speed my turn up because of my critical case? I beg you."

**7.3-**The *medium* such as *sad-speaking-tone, words-writing-sheet, painful-marking-picture, knocking-doors, singing, sports, prays*, influences the communication via the way of using it, as in the conversation which is occurred between a serious mother and her spendthrift child: "Please, mom." In a *sad-tone*, he speaks, "Buy this blue spider-man for me? I beg you, I beg you," viz., some cases of begging speech act are produced by the children toward their parents.

**7.4-**The *form of beg-message* when its structural patterns identify the communication either via *the choice of specific sounds, reverence and/or slang words*, or somehow particular grammatical constructions as *a small-scale*. Or via the choice or possible course of precise genre as *a large-scale*, for instance, when grad students invite a well-known professor to their symposium as in: "Please, Professor Bernard." Voice of more than one speaker: "Can you come to our symposium next Sunday, please? We are begging you, Sir."

**7.5-**The issue's matter in which its *impact on the content of communication* on both sides *explicitly* (what is said) and *implicitly* (what is implied). For example, *implicit begging is*, in formal situations, occurred, in a talkable situation, between boss and employee; and *explicit begging is*, at the family-dinner, happened, in a conversationalized situation, between the son or daughter and his/her parents.

**7.6-***Begging-code* in which its influence represents *stretches of words* whether inside the formal system of communication such as spoken language, justifiable expressions, written sheets, or *sign language in America, Arabic, or Russian*. Or it is inside informal circumstances or some combinations of the previous multi-choices. For instance, when *an Arabic boy goes to buy some medications from a pharmacy*. In his way, his money is dropped at the deep-hole of excavations-fixing works beside the boy-walking street. Then, the boy sadly tries to inform a police officer who stands nearby traffic signal, said: "I want to buy some treatments to my sick-mom, but I lose my money (as a justification)." The policeman said: "How can I help you?" The boy begs: "Sir, can you save my money up from the damn hole? I beg you, please, Sir."

**7.7-Activity in which a participant is engaged** in such activity as a cross-examining, having a debate in a conversation, adopt some conduct, or opt a historical or societal means. For example, *an angry style of dialogue to some persons mostly often ends in begging and regret expressions*. Likewise, some cases of begging speech act are conducted by persons who have worked within a dictatorship order, and the reason for those is that they seek to live at the lowest grade of others' rights and the highest grade of others' obligations to their noncompliance.

**7.8-The agents' action** refers to those number(s) of people whose central role potentially focuses on, take part in an interaction such as *the addressee(s), addressor(s), and passer(s)-by*.

**7.9-Interpersonal-face** in which the information influences the immediate situation where the active information concerns the addressor's intention towards the addressee (or the assignee), as well as the expectation of the addressor to the addressee *within mostly face-to-face interaction*. For instance, some addressors use figurative language to attract assignees' face to visualize some things, or to make them see some other things in a new way.

**7.10-Monologue-thesis** in which its experiential and logical tips together influence the information of the whole situation, which is being described by the addressor. However, the addressor reports and observes the thesis situation; he does not otherwise interfere at the result of the addressee's positive/negative reply, as in Lavinia's words when she sat down again, saying, *"Poor Spintho! And it won't even count as martyrdom!"* then The Keeper of the lions is said: *"Serve him right! What call had he to walk down the throat of one of my lions before he was asked?"* Meanwhile, Androcles then soliloquizes himself in a crowded contradicted situation, to activate the keeper and the editor's emotion and, then, to gain his begging desire, as in *"Perhaps the lion won't eat me now,"* (Androcles and the lion, 1957, Act II, p. 130).

**7.11-Accommodation** in which there is a tendency between the addressor and the addressee, with, somehow, downward of the former's *societal values* and different *social backgrounds*. These probable figures emerge in the evolution/retardation process of the human race following the recognition of accommodation either in a concurrent level or divergent one. For example, *the cooperation process which progresses between the richest merchants as an assignee and the various organizations of civil society as an addressor*. This process of cooperativity is done according to the accommodation of these organizations' methodology and mutual-social benefits between the beneficiary and the benefactor alike.

**7.12-Dialect-social role** shows its *regional aspect, its social and geographical, as well as its folklore collections and their user guides*. Factors such as sex, age, white-black backgrounds, or ethnic group, social variety of classes, till now, are seen as critical matters of pure regional aspects unless they are culturally tackled. The conversation of classes, which occurs between bourgeoisie mother and the lower-class girl, embodies this topic, as in The mother: *"How do you know that my son's name is Freddy, pray?"*, to reply the flower girl: *"Ow, eez ye-ooa san, is e? Wal, fewd dan y' de-ooty bawmz a mather should, eed now bettern to spawl a pore gel's flahrzn than ran awy atbaht pyin. Will ye-oo py me f'them? [Here, with apologies, this desperate attempt to represent her dialect without a phonetic alphabet must be abandoned as unintelligible outside London.]"* (English Pygmalion, 1957, Act I, p. 9).

Meanwhile, the important notions of enough communication, as it is clarified by Spolsky's (1998) explanations, are ambuscaded in part of what is determined by the event's nature (i.e., the addressor has no one to communicate or converge, to beg something precisely and, actively with until the addressee says something) on the one hand. It is a consequence, on the other hand, that part of what is determined by the appropriate social rules of what it is appropriate to say in defined occasions to people who beg for something since the meaning of act, as shown by Bara (2010, p. 60), is established via the interaction of *"speaking and listening"* or *"writing and reading"*. Likewise, the meaning of a word, like begging to mean, according to Wittgenstein (2009, p. 190), is neither the experience *"one has in hearing"* nor *"uttering it"* since the sentence is composed of its words and that is enough, since we, in general, communicate with other persons without knowing, that those people, whether they have these experiences too.

Strictly speaking, the action of formal begging starts after formal sets of greetings and questioning about the parties' health, as well as their presumed families, sometimes also turn to comments on the weather or some other neutral topics, reach finally to mention some commercial aims to the events. These sets, in other words, require that begging performative action cannot successfully broach unless social exchanges be execute since the speech act of begging indicates, in a positive aspect, an intimacy and cooperatively tenets when the cognitive agent's action feels very close to enough amount with the addressee to perform, for the former, the beneficiary action that s/he begs for at the prediction of the propositional content.

Otherwise, the informal accomplishment of the act of begging can skip the above sets to direct negotiation and convergence interpersonally or impersonally to arrive at a cost or a beneficiary action that satisfies the addressor and the addressee. Notably, the process of begging may involve the appearance of bystander or passerby, in Middle Eastern usage, who participates firstly with the addressee to develop the negotiation for the addressor's advantage.

However, Abd al-Mutalib (2007) shows that the rhetorical look monitors the deepest transformational totted, which primarily depends on the estimative presence of the addressee and the latter's implicit participation can share at the production of meaning. The presumptive presence of the addressee, either s/he is attendance or absence, is immediately accompanied by the requestive gestalt to produce a logical-causal relationship for the completion of the persuasive formula of our targeted act.

To sum up, enough communication can be conceived capaciously, but here we adapt the researches' purpose to the paradigms communicative scenarios. Cruse (2000) elucidates that the transfer of information between an addressor as the sender's transmitted begging message and an addressee as the receiver's received message, of begging in question, via their genetic code, represents the scope of communication among the biological generations. So, if every detail of the message of begging is crucial for the proposition being transmitted, the enough conversation would probably be a chancy business since efficient communication would compensate any loss of information via structuring a degree of redundancy into the reference or signal since the information of begging is sometimes given more than once, as well as it can be, by the addressor's indication, predictable from other bits of the signal since the meaningful message of begging in use, as Nino and Snow's (1996) important explanations, consists an interpersonal, impersonal, collaborative process via creating the shared significance. Thus, the entire message can culturally reconstruct, even though there is a significant loss.

## 8. The Privileges of Power Minus/Plus Solidarity

Language, in general, centripetally concerns assuredly with figures in our lives since it reflects, as in Widdowson's (1996) elucidations, our individuals' identity and others of social beings when those cognitive agents discover and acquire language's basics during our juvenescence period. Language, consequently, via its dynamic purposes, provides its users with present and future plans and needs, which carries with, the impression of things past, where it enables the users, in their community, to think for themselves, and to cooperate with other users of their community either in a nominal way or a pronominal one since it serves on the one hand as a cognition and meta-communication means and on the other hand as a genetic skill and a generic accomplishment.

An interesting thing of addressed communicative pronouns, in French, Spanish, German, Italian, English, Arabic, and some others, is the precise association to the fundamentals of those pronouns' social life analysis, viz., the singular pronoun form reflects reverence, adoration, and polite *distance*, in addition to its form of variable plural, viz., the dimensions of power and solidarity as in Brown and Gilman's (1960) explanations of pronouns. Studies of psychology, sociology, linguistics, and literature respectively depend on semantic, semantic plus context, and stylistic analyses of the power-solidarity pronouns. However, the two pronouns of address commence, via European development, with *tu* and *vos* in Latin. Culturally, they become *tu* and *voi* in Italian used, *tu* and *vous* in French, and like Latin, *tu* and *vos* in Spanish. While, in the Arabic language, the pronouns are changed by Harakat (the signs) like *al-skun*, *al-fatHa*, *al-dhamma*, and *al-kasra*, to refer to singular, duality, or plural as well as masculine and feminine. The researcher affirms Kadim and Raham's (2019) views about the multiple forms of pronouns of address. These address forms are divided into two ways when they are used to either power situations or solidarity ones. Strictly speaking, the detached pronouns are two types at the direct used for solidarity situations of presence persons firstly like [anta and iyyaka, anti and iyyaki, antuma and iyyakuma, antum and iyyakum, and antunna and iyyakunna] and secondly of absence persons like [huwa and iyyahu, hiya and iyyaha, huma and iyyahuma, hum and iyyahum, and hunna and iyyahunna]. Whereas, the attached pronouns are used in two ways for power situations of presence persons firstly like [ka, ki, kuma, kum, and kunna] as in Hadhratuka (your grace), and of absence persons in the second instance like [hu, ha, huma, hum, and hunna] as in Hadhratuhum (your lordship). Thus, we logically conclude that the cultural pragmatic symbolization of the Arabic pronouns and harakats together simultaneously combines the high border of solidarity and the low border of power between the addressor and the addressee who are distant acquaintances and it will be a vice versa with those interlocutors who are close friends. Thus, language, as it is logically explained by Friedrich (1986), as cited in Tannen (2007, p. 39), represents:

*The symbolic process that mediates between, on the one hand, ideas/feelings and, on the other hand, the sounds produced by the tongue, larynx, and so forth. Poetry, analogously, is the symbolic process by which the individual mediates between the music of a natural language and the (nuances of) mythic meaning. To create felt consubstantiality between language music and myth is the master trope of*

*poetry—‘master’ because it is superordinate to and in control over such lesser figures as image, metaphor, and paradox. And this master trope is unique; that is, it is diagnostic of poetry.*

Respectively, the distinction of pronouns is involved *du* and *Ihr* in German. So, the latest traditional use of ‘*thou*’ and ‘*you*’ are exploited by English users. For a polite usage and a familiar version in a language, Brown and Gilman (1960) are proposed to use, the symbols of Latin pronouns *T* for mutual singular and *V* for singular and plural as well as the more the appropriate one in their generic designation since Goffman (1967, p. 16) clearly shows “*when the person knows the others well, he will know what issues ought not to be raised and what situations the others ought not to be placed in, and he will be free to introduce matters at will in all other areas. When the others are strangers to him, he will often reverse the formula, restricting himself to specific areas he knows are safe*”, as in the following social Pygmalion dialogue between common-girl and master-man:

*Liza: I’m sorry. I’m only a common ignorant girl; and in my station I have to be careful. There can’t be any feelings between the like of [you] and the like of me. Please will you tell me what belongs to me and what doesn’t?*  
*Higgins: [Very sulky] You may take the whole demand houseful if you like. Except the jewels. They’re hired. Will that satisfy you? [He turns on his heel and is about to go in extreme dudgeon]* (English Pygmalion, 1957, Act IV, p. 78).

Accordingly, when the interlocutors talk, in a small or long dialogue, to each other, they do not only convey the meaning of what they are saying at their conversation, as shown by Dirven and Verspoor (2004) but they, also, negotiate their relationship in that communicative interaction. So, the cognitive agent’s action needs to take into consideration what his/her addressee might think, feel, or want, rather than s/he only says, to her/his recipient, what s/he thinks, feels or begs for/about. Otherwise, there was much of insoluble communication, in Old French, Italian, Spanish, Portuguese, and Middle English, between *T* and *V*; for example, the choice, in verse, sometimes seems to have assonance, syllable, or rhyme account to set power crystalized norms.

Likewise, Brown and Levinson (1987) distinguish, in the term, the main strategies of politeness into three macro-politeness strategies, as in the following:

- i-Positive politeness strategy, here, is dealt with expressions of solidarity.*
- ii-Negative politeness strategy, here, is concerned with the expression of restraint.*
- iii-Off-record politeness strategy, here, is focused on how people avoid their unequivocal impositions.*

Since face equals self-esteem of individuals, Brown and Levinson (1987) claim that these strategies are worked only if they are adopted by the addressor and the addressee at their performative relationship, taking into consideration the implicit offensiveness of their message-content, and if these strategies are closely used within social determinants of circularity system.

Theoretically, any users or interlocutors can say or write anything they *like depending on the appropriate tools that they have, in addition to their prior knowledge and/or experience*. Whilst practically, those communicators will, mostly unconsciously, follow a huge number of rules which socially constrain written or spoken ways that they use. Norms of formality, politeness, superiority, and the like, are barriers which people need to assimilate since, Leech (1980) clearly shows that, solidarity represents the horizontal social *distance*, and the lack of it will increase due to the lack of familiarity. The implied signs or signing behavior are encoded what those users, *like beggars, requesters, promisors, threateners* sincerely want to, via messaging, convey either these codes are accurately unconscious choices or conscious pronominal ones. Crystal (2006, p. 275) asserts that the cultural pragmatic factors in our social life always have an impact on our grammatical constructions, sounds selections, divergences of vocabularies from those users’ language resources. Like the importance of teaching, some basic rules at a very early age *like please, thank you, direct and indirect request or beg, and many others*, there are also significant cross-cultural pragmatic distinctions, in many languages, of politeness, of intimacy, of solidarity, which reflecting rigid observance of convention rules or etiquette, and systems or matters of social status, role, and class. A clarifying example is as in the following:

*“A well-studied example is the pronoun system, which frequently presents distinctions that convey pragmatic force—such as the choice between *tu* and *vous* in French, or the use of pronouns of respect in several oriental languages”* (ibid.)

Within the context of language in use, the use and/or vary of expressions, according to Crystal’s “how we choose what to say” (2006, p. 275) manifestations, greatly differ(s) in accordance with aspects of politeness (*viz.*, when addressees’ protect their public image by attending to the social rights and face needs of themselves and the frequency of the others’ meaning,

conventions of question or begging, and rules-govern, viz., the function and force of the targeted meaning is, whether it is, writing, speaking, or signing. On the other hand, those factors and aspects focus on what will be encoded, such as the distinction choice which occurs between *tu* and *vous*, in the language's structure.

Likewise, the consequence of the addressed pronouns' usages, as in Al-Sulaimaan's (2010) explanation, was related to the medieval periods and the very ancient centuries as well. The upper classes, at that time, began to exploit forms of V Latin symbol in their communication usage to show aspects of natural politeness and respect. While the members of the upper classes are addressed via mutual V between themselves, others from the lower classes are used T as a mutual reciprocal pronoun. With that T, as a term pronoun, the members of upper classes are addressed their counterparts of the lower classes' ones, but the formers have been received V as a vice versa. In other words, asymmetric connection within power represents the most inferior formula of comparative degree plus-than minus-the, viz., weaker than, poorer than, or smaller than, whereas symmetric relationship via solidarity represents adopting some advantaged works, giving appropriate sums of money, feeling the other's negative manner or statue, and so on, on the one hand. Meanwhile, the usages of the T-V pronouns by the users of upper classes reflect non-reciprocal aspects and come to characterize a power nexus, the members' usages of the lower classes of the T-V pronouns show reciprocal performance and place to symbolize a solidarity relationship, on the other hand.

However, Brown and Gilman shed some light on the reciprocal or symmetrical nexuses of T and V and non-reciprocal or asymmetrical usages of these two pronouns as well. There are many aspects of power and solidarity which characterize the relationship between the addressee, who is the real assignee of the performative begging act (viz., the addressee has the superior power in the degree that s/he is capable to control and master the addressor's behavior, viz., some cases of begging speech act are produced by slaves towards their masters) and the addressor who wants the addressee's social solidarity of either T or V in a polite usage since these formulas of addresses are traditionally used as an apt explanations of the life-style connections since the deepest periods of the past times as in the following:

*Pope George I (590-604) used T to his subordinates in the ecclesiastical hierarchy and they invariably said V to him... the nobility said T to the common people and received V; the master of a house said T to his slave, his servant, his squire, and received V... parents gave T to children and were given V... penitents said V to the priest and were told T ... In Froissart God says T to His angels and they say V... man says T to the animals... In the plays... the noble principals say T to their subordinates and are given V in return (1960, p. 255).*

In particular, the designation propriety of Freud derives, following his psychological aims, from the individual's available learning of a language that reflects the order of semantic generalization. Freud's belief reminds the later social connections as a prototype of the individual and the family, as well as resuscitates other semantic powers of the superior-inferior nexus like an old-recent begging either it is for money or something else. Not every people's attribution counts as enough solidarity to carry out the mutual V or T, since solidarity represents the precise name we give to the general relationship, but color, size, similarities of some matters, behavior dispositions, political membership, family, profession, sex, religion, birthplace, etc., are all faces of solidarity. In addition, we show, depending on Goffman (1967) logically explanations, that the addressor's face and his/her counterpart's face are constructed of the same order, viz., the group's rules and the precise definition of the situation of begging, which can determine how much feeling the wanter is needed to have for face-gaining of begging and how this feeling is to be allotted among the faces involved. Traditionally, solidarity comes on the semantic level where the two dimensional systems are in equilibrium (wherein one dimension occurs among power equals as a means of differentiating address, and the second dimension introduces the semantic system among the levels of equivalent power). While the pronoun T derives as it is either condescension or intimacy, the V pronoun exploits as it is either reverence or formality. Therefore, the dimension of solidarity is primarily applicable to all personal terms of address. So solidarity can be recognized more gracefully from the richer than the poorer, the elder than the younger, the employer than the employee, we can get that, the solidarity has gained supremacy over other cultural pragmatic tools. Consequently, begging speech act can be accomplished performatively via solidarity, better than power, in a more positive way since some cases, of begging speech act, are performed by the hungrier, thirstier, or any needier persons toward the most givable ones.

It is a consequence that eight axes govern the whole situational context; viz., they are worked as in the following:

**8.1-Reciprocal power** as in *parents*, viz., familial prototype (i.e., *husband and wife's begging nexus*), which recently reaches as a sign of elegance.

**8.2-Reciprocal solidarity** as in *priest and his penitents*, i.e., *the nexus of begging of feeling a transgression and forgiving it* since this type potentially reflects a very *significant ideological relationship between radicalism and conservatism usages*.

**8.3-Non-reciprocal power** as in *master and his squire*, i.e., *the action of begging sometimes costs a receiver since the interlocutors of T-V have unequal power.*

**8.4-Non-reciprocal solidarity** as in *a man and animals*, i.e., *there is minus solidarity of performativity of begging act between them since extended solidarity to all men alike clearly appears nuclear of solidarity.*

**8.5-Symmetrical power** as in *two children within the same level*, i.e., *a general begging act embodies the microcosm of the family since different styles of this power type are different ways of accomplishing the same thing.*

**8.6-Symmetrical solidarity** as in *common people*, i.e., *a particularize begging appears between those ordinary people as a mark of solidarity of a high degree in-group better than it in out-group.*

**8.7-Asymmetrical power** as in *God and His angels*, i.e., *this type of power predominatingly creates begging act since awareness of addressee's power reflects addressor's special attitude towards positively or negatively usage of the pronouns.*

**8.8-Asymmetrical solidarity** as in *the subordinates and Pope*, i.e., *this type of solidarity will achieve the action of begging positively since not all differences of solidarity between communicators connote a disparity of power.*

As a recapitulation, the nuclear of T-V pronouns express the ideology of communicators when they instantiate the construction meaning of begging speech act. Behavior norms interpret the pronouns as a normal membership in a group where the choice of meaning seeks the variation of address between two persons under their attitudes under scrutiny, i.e., the researcher can logically say that the discretion means politeness. Therefore, the addressor must use it since it consists, according to Goffman's (1967) view, the respect for the secret or the specific will of the other. It may be the case of begging that the piece of give or a receive is being addressed to a generic public rather than to a specific addressee. It may be catalyzed by the addressor's attempt to augment the mitigation of his/her begging act. Respectively, the force of the giving-receiving T-V pronouns of begging action is sometimes softened by, the way which is, not referring to the particular addressee directly. Furthermore, the deictic verbs of giving and receiving referrals to the involvement of the addressor, beside the main assignee's action (i.e., the addressee), in the bringing about of some states of affairs. Thus, the addressor may impersonally reflect the potential agent of the action of begging if the apparent doer, viz., the addressee, gives, to him, his consent.

## **9. The Pragmatic Considerations and Modulations: Furthers in Conclusions and Manners of Discussions**

Cognitive, if not cooperative, addressor, as it is persuasively mentioned by Austin (1962) and extractively confirms by Vanderveken (1990), uses a sentence (or an utterance) with a targeted thought for communication in an appropriate context means to achieve a targeted speech act. Throughout Vanderveken's explanations, English, Arabic, and most of the actual languages have a large number of verbs that work in a performative manner like promise, beg, vow, and so on, which, by the addressor, also work to name targeted utterances of illocutionary acts; we here extrapolate, about begging, that the addressor begs something literally, and the illocutionary act of his precise utterance is the act of begging, which is expressed by the sentence that the latter is used in a context of that targeted utterance, since (any) successful performative utterance of a speech act, like begging, in an attempt to perform it, represents a part of what it means and intends, to make the addressee understanding it, in the context of its use of that utterance since human beings live, as shown by Sapir (1949), at the mercy of the specific language which has become the expressing medium for their society (rather than they alone live neither in the objective world nor in the social world as ordinarily understood).

In completion to Austin and Vanderveken's elucidations, Al-Ddahi (2011) potentially shows that language exploits pragmatically to establish understandability among humans, and by which, those humans adapt their needs and negotiate about themselves to invest their sharing conventions and norms to gain either public begging projects or private advantages of begging. Therefore, Al-Ddahi adds some of the pragmatic-communicative fundamentals, which can be construed, at the pragmatic-linguistic understandability of cognitive tactics of performative begging speech act, as in the following:

*i-The development of understandability supports the harmonization between the addressor and the addressee, viz., interlocutors, for guidance their works into successful, are sharing projects.*

*ii-The procedures of morality discussions between the addressor and the assignee can drive the persuasion process into progressing findings and satisfiable uttermost.*

*iii-The environment of agreement, among the addressor, the addressee, observer, audience, and impartial, which each one needs to be acted for communicative roles at words and deeds.*

*iv-The world of the living, Arabic or English situation, may pay the interlocutors to do their tasks, in a better way as possible as they can, by depending on their daily or social acknowledgment, and normative congruency.*

According to pragmatics' views of "Possibilities and Limitations of Pragmatics" (1981) like Parret, Sbisa, Verschueren, and others, we focus on the detailed and *hermeneutical* pragmatics in accompanied with other traditional featured disciplines. Throughout the process of *hermeneutician*, an overlap of perspectives and methodologies can be understood as sophisticated usage of language which has been solved. Contrariwise, without it, these overlapping tips may not guide automatically to a unified way or science of the multiple uses of language. One of the critical (cultural) pragmatic views, for example, is the study of begging under the macro of contextual changes and the micro of mental changes since, the author of this view, Balmer (1981, p. 49) shows, that his critical study, that if people think that his language model is based on a traditional view, he fears that they may be right. Retrospectively, in a natural way of working speech acts, Balmer elaborates that there are four major groups of acts of speech to perform changes at each level of context, which are physical, mental, social, and linguistic levels of changes of context. Accordingly, mental changes of context are concerned with begging speech acts accompanied by altering of emotions as in "*beg, implore, pray...*" (*ibid.*), which reflect a thoroughly cross-cultural pragmatic motif of language use.

It is assumed, as shown by Green and Morgan's (1981) elucidations, that an adequate business process of *hermeneutical* pragmatics is to supply an account for an observable behavior of the mental reality. Since this process' function works towards an interpretation which partially goes on the grounds of how the addressee understands the targeted text of begging, it is sometimes constituted functions and settings. Since meaning is susceptible of several interpretations, this process is attempted to recover the meaning of the doubtful text, to differentiate the force of begging from the work of other speech and performative acts, to arrive at the understandable stage. In addition, the comprehension of data of the context of begging contains the goals, desires or intentions, of the addressor, in saying what the cognitive agent said at the content of the proposition.

Consequently, the foci of the crucial oscillation, here, is that acts which are being resulted from the interpretation task involve speech acts which are characterized, as begging featured, as they are ranging from Austinian phatic act (or classical illocutionary acts), and Searlian acts (or referring illocutionary acts) to continue such acts with more detailed characterization *as in mentioning, sequencing, intoning, pausing, describing, and even failing to implicating*. Furthermore, these, above acts' characteristics, can involve acts that do not categorize speech at all, as in a deep in thought of begging developmental model in here, *like gesturing, staring, glancing, winking, etc.*, viz., gestural begging. Therefore, the addressee's task towards the addressor's desire may change in the course of arriving at the process of interpretation since the former will attempt to form a model of the latter's act of begging as a word and the rest of things as a world which fitted to it in accordance with his beliefs and attitudes. Thus, we logically conclude the task of the addressee of begging act at the process of interpretation of the text to the use of language, as in the following:

*i-Addressee's interpretation process includes the use of expressions' properties that cannot be prognosticated from the meanings of literal communication.*

*ii-Addressee's interpretation process consists of conversational knowledge and literary conventions.*

*iii-Addressee's interpretation process contains encyclopedic knowledge that reflects the world to fit kinds and knowledge about human nature, consequences of events, abilities to make multiple conjunctions and inferences about these acts.*

It is a consequence that the addressor sends a package of thoughts through his words or expressions to be unpacked to the addressee who has interpreted them via the means of understanding them before encoding and decoding his/her addressor's begging of thoughts, or text, or utterance ultimately.

It is very natural to say that different cultures due to divergent directionalities of cross-cultural pragmatics, for instance, and thereto some trends are exploited at the harmonization and variation levels. Blum-Kulka and House (1989) show that there is an agreement, at the cross-cultural standards, trends to the license of directness, and at the situational variation, there is culturally a trend to the specific choices of overall directness. All the while, this approach is calculated that the speech act behavior, of begging, contextually frames external and internal some factors such as the role of interlocutors' social distance and power, and rights and obligations, on the one hand, whereas the directed features of the nature of our targeted speech act relate to the addressor's precise goal and his imposition degree, as well as his/her prerequisites which are involved for compliance, on the other.

In a similar manner, Brown and Fraser (1979, pp. 36-8), potentially intend to show, throughout the situation, that the best markers, of begging, are constituted three levels of categories, as in the following:

*i-Linguistic forms are concerned with the context of phonology, lexicon, syntax, and paralinguistic features.*

*ii- Internal forms which are dealt with the context of phonological environment, function, and meaning.*

*iii-External forms are related to the context of social categories such as addressor, addressee, setting, subject, and activity type.*

Thus, these three contextual situation markers are understood via the relationship among themselves. In other words, the forms of linguistic context are understood via the denotation of strategy's choices, while the forms of internal context are elaborated via the specific study of the requestive situation, for instance, the specific context of begging speech act, whereas the forms or external context are denoted to the social context.

However, the illocutionary impact of the communicative act, according to Sadock, as cited in Horn and Ward (2006, p. 70), can be performed practically by any utterance which is given the right happenings of external usages. Therefore, we, here, regard, that the proper request is the highest border that is preceded the act of begging, when it checks the ability of the addressee's compliance, to overcome upon the possibility of the latter's refusal ground on the one hand, and to avoid, at least, some negative space of face-saving, after it has been admitted, at the appropriate situation on the other hand. Meanwhile, the addressor may save the successful achievement of the communicative targeted goal via the time the appropriate being spared for the crucial need of the nonadmitted, act or event, before, condition of the addressor's beneficiary act. However, cultural factors are interacted, for English, Arabic, and each language, three main levels of directness as in the most direct level of understandability (of impositions for instance), the intermediate level (of convention indirectness), and the least direct level (of non-convention indirectness) (Blum-Kulk et al., 1989). Whilst, situational variation factors of directness understandability levels can trend to the addressor's right for begging compliance, addressor's social impact over the addressee, addressee's obligation, addressee's oscillation for compliance, and the probable difficulty in getting the targeted addressor's act.

The nature of moral judgment which commutes from the oldest periods, of Arabic, English, Latin and others' several cultures to Kant's and modern natural law theories, has been cognitively attempted to *hermeneuieren* pragmatic performative ways to lifelike acts or event, like begging speech act, in a contextual environment. In 1990, Habermas elucidates, via his theory of moral consciousness actions, several philosophical view, via the American pragmatics of Lawrence Kohlberg who is projected six moral judgment stages as gradual approximations to structures judgments about relevant actions morally throughout the development of the capacity of reversibility, universality, and the importance of reciprocity, as the hereunder detailed:

*Level A, preconventional level*  
*punishment and obedience*

*Stage-1, the stage of*

*Content: Right is literal obedience to rules and authority, avoiding punishment, and not doing physical harm.*

*i-What is right is to avoid breaking rules, to obey for obedience' sake, and to avoid doing physical damage to people and property.*

*ii-The reasons for doing right are avoidance of punishment and the superior power of authorities.*

*Stage-2, the stage of individual instrumental purpose and exchange*

*i-What is right is following rules when it is to someone's immediate interest. Right is acting to meet one's own interests and needs and letting others do the same. Right is also what is fair; that is, what is an equal exchange, a deal, an agreement.*

*ii-The reason for doing right is to serve one's own needs or interests in a world where one must recognize that other people have their interests, too.*

*Level B, conventional level*

*Stage-3, the stage of mutual interpersonal expectations, relationships, and conformity*

*Content: The right is playing a good (nice) role, being concerned about the other people and their feelings, keeping loyalty and trust with partners, and being motivated to follow rules and expectations.*

*i-What is right is living up to what is expected by people close to one or what people generally expect of people in one's role as son, sister, friends, and so on. 'Being good' is important and means having good motives, showing concern about others. It also means keeping mutual relationships, maintaining trust, loyalty, respect, and gratitude.*

*ii-Reasons for doing right are needing to be good in one's own eyes and those of others, caring for others, and because if one puts oneself in the other person's place one would want good behavior from the self (Golden Rule).*

*Stage-4, the stage of social system and conscience maintenance*

*Content: The right is doing one's duty in society, upholding the social order, and maintaining the welfare of society or the group.*

*i-What is right is fulfilling the actual duties to which one has agreed. Laws are to be upheld except in extreme cases where they conflict with other fixed social duties and rights. Right is also contributing to society, the group, or institution.*

*ii-The reasons for doing right are to keep the institution going as a whole, self-respect or conscience as meeting one's defined obligations, or the consequences: "What if everyone did it?"*

*Level C, post conventional and principled level*

*Moral decisions are generated from rights, values or principles that are (or could be) agreeable to all individuals composing or creating a society designed to have fair and beneficial practices.*

*Stage-5, the stage of prior rights and social contract or utility*

*Content: The right is upholding the basic rights, values, and legal contracts of a society, even when they conflict with the concrete rules and laws of the group.*

*i-What is right is being aware of the fact that people hold a variety of values and opinions that most values and rules are relative to one's group. These 'relative' rules should usually be upheld, however, in the interest of the impartiality and because they are the social contract. Some nonrelative values and rights such as life, and liberty, however, must be upheld in any society and regardless of majority opinion.*

*ii-Reasons for doing right are, in general, feeling obligated to obey the law because one has made a social contract to make and abide by laws, for the good of all and to protect their own rights and the rights of others. Family, friendship, trust, and work obligations are also commitments or contracts freely entered into and entail respect for the rights of others. One is concerned that laws and duties be based on rational calculation of overall utility: "The greatest good for the greatest number."*

*Stage-6, the stage of universal ethical principles*

*Content: This stage assumes guidance by universal ethical principles that all humanity should follow.*

*i-Regarding what is right, Stage 6 is guided by universal ethical principles. Particular laws or social agreements are usually valid because they rest on such principles. When laws violate these principles, one acts in accordance with the principle. Principles are universal principles of justice: the equality of human rights and respect for the dignity of human beings as individuals. These are not merely values that are recognized, but are also principles used to generate particular decisions.*

*ii-The reason for doing right is that, as a rational person, one has seen the validity of principles and has become committed to them (Habermas, 1990, pp. 123-25).*

It is necessary to say, via Habermas and Kohlberg's assumptions, that the developmental approach of moral results' of actions, like cultural-pragmatic begging speech act, can help the addressor to rebuild or distinguish or/and solve the needed-cognitive structures of moral relevant dilemmas that s/he has in a consensual manner. In addition, the deference behavior of the addressor and politely affected tone are, in many ways, more courtesy and reinforce the addressee's desire to comply wherein these behavioral tips lessen the low regard and give the addressee the typical benefit of the doubt.

In order to take into consideration living *hermeneutics* and cultural pragmatic utterances, Wierzbicka (1999) and Gaylin (1979, p. 2) logically explain that what if implies must equal to what the interlocutors implicate, and what emotions referred to must also equivalent to what interlocutor's feelings reflect. Gaylin exemplifies that "*feeling is our subjective awareness of our emotional state*", (ibid.) therefore, it can be extracted that if the addressee does not know what his/her addressor's feelings mean, then s/he would not know what his/her *beggar's/begger's* emotional states mean, too. According to what is abovementioned, social impacts on conveyed intents have affected the activities of the addressee, which are conveyed an apt comprehension of the social agreement of the addressor and the addressee [viz., interlocutors] via condescension, reciprocity, anger, or love.

Likewise, Ervin-Tripp (1981) intrinsically goes to show that these intents can be projected via well-defined acts such as directives and sub-acts like begging speech act wherein they are systematically concerned with interlocutors' relative

properties of variables rank, age, familiarity, and distance to the relevance of the task and normal interactional roles. Important efforts are categorized, by Ervin-Tripp, to encourage actions where they have consequences as control moves like the major categories: directives, prohibitions, and ownership claims and such the sub-major categories as offers, promises, begs, requests, and some of others like statements of intentions if they have consequences for the addressee's actions. Giving permission or help after the said of addressor's wheedling-tone differentiates that the cognitive addressor is the principal beneficiary agent of the action more than the addressee who carries the act of begging, as the directives, depending on the former's strong desires and circumstances.

It is a consequence that begging speech act has accepted as the proper request which may be susceptible to the collapse of communication, and it cannot be surprising that some interlocutors are, sometimes, not sure of their communicative intents because of the preceded nonadmitted action which is not clearly used the common form "Can you?" and its consequences 'its desired action' for the admitted begging thing. Throughout mutual and cooperative goals and claims, there are so many cultural pragmatic problems of interpretation of actions which are endemic, at the relative skills, ranks, differences, and so on, at the addressor and the addressee's intended act, since people in general and interlocutors, in particular, make some mental health actions that should be done more and more rather than they conflate their messages and actions, since real languages can focally allow its users to decode social relationships or goals, whilst other-codes may remain at the background, i.e., it is a consequence that cross-cultural social implications of begging act can only be correctly understood if the addressor and the addressee know the inexplicit usage of distribution of the calculated forms of situational context which makes that speech intentions so clear, since begging speech act may also occur via altering attention and, by the way, this knowledge leads the addressee to enough understanding of what his/her addressor needs to execute the next. Thus, the interlocutors may unwittingly violate conventional roles unless the importance of social roles activates at the developmental dimensions of the event or role's expectations. We should also note that the language of begging, of this view, is exploited to satisfy understandability if needed, to control the timing of attention, to specify actions and actors or agents, to supply reasons and *hermeneuticians*, to change social relations which are affected by directives or control moves.

As a recapitulation, firstly, many (if not all) philosophers, structures, and researchers suffer from the biggest challenges of *hermeneuticians*. They have attempted to elaborate the *hermeneutical* foci of multiple processes, combinations, and phenomena inside the circulatory system of linguistics and non-linguistics, and by which, these elaborative attempts (controlling moves of states of affairs) can be brought into close relations with well-nigh every living pragmatic constituent. Strictly speaking, Becker (1995) shows, as cited in Tannen (2007, p. 11), that there are six essential contextual relations of capturing the meaning (of such as, begging, for example), as in the following:

- i-Structural relations are concerned with parts to whole,*
- ii-Generic relations are concerned with text to prior text,*
- iii-Medial relations are concerned with text to medium,*
- iv-Interpersonal relations are concerned with text to participants in a text-act,*
- v-Referential relations are concerned with text to nature and to the world which one believes in lying beyond language,*
- vi-Silential relations are dealt with text to the unsaid and unsayable.*

Therefore, the importune use of the autograph begging function has been actionable to fit and has also been righteous to forward bring the uttermost deepest production which is aroused unexpectedly natural need to use of action for somehow an immediate reaction, especially if the addressor calls for having complicated properties as a whole than other properties which its ingredients are contributed, by the addressee, individually. Therefore, addressor's persuasive argument of begging is tackled via cross-cultural pragmatic processes, the challengeable ground of the cognitive agent's action of neither refusing addressor's act nor nonadmitted his/her right since the diversity here represents a new inevitable trend of control moves of acts at the circularity of intersectionality. As such, the speech act of begging can presently work at the communicative circularity, according to Ibáñez's (2008) elucidations of the communicative act. This communicative process, as it is preceding said, superimposes the general successful ingredients, such as the addressor, the addressee, and the contextual situation, via what Jakobson's call of the communicative functions as in the following:

- i-Referential communicative function represents the nexus between the message and the specific entity which is referenced.*
- ii-Emotive communicative function represents the nexus between the addressor and the message.*
- iii-Connative communicative function represents the nexus between the message and the addressee (who is the assignee).*
- iv-Poetic communicative function represents the nexus of the message and its ingredients.*

*v-Metalinguistic communicative function represents the nexus between the code and the message.*

*vi-Factive communicative function represents the nexus between the addressor and the addressee.*

The parameters of our targeted approach are consequently evident and are specially marked via *hermeneutician*. There are, also, two basal kinds of *hermeneuticians*, as shown by Crystal (2006), which are, the consecutive method which represents, the first procedure, when the encounter *hermeneutics* the finished speech of the addressor, mostly in informal situations, via the very end of the discourse. While, at the formal situations, the encounter decodes his/her addressor's speech via the simultaneous method, which attracts the most interests because of the especial complexity of the needing task, since the contextual situation is somehow routinely required to listen and speak into an acceptable form in the goal language. Likewise, we can say that *hermeneutician* is an inevitable living process in an interactional cross-cultural pragmatic differentiation. Similarly, Tovaes (2006) relatively shows that living *hermeneutics* is better captured the everyday nature of making the targeted meaning in dialogue.

Thus, many researchers, linguists as well as philosophers, have used inconstruable concepts and ideas. And without receivers or addressees' consciousness, these ambiguous uses can cause inescapably infelicitous absorbable communication. Concerning the preceding connotations in variations of languages and cultures, Wierzbicka (1999) shows that a man can expositoryly have a value to inquiries which are only addressed and aroused the basis of persons' fundamentals and habits. Persons who have no special characteristics, according to some ordinary investigations into great and many languages like *English, Arabic, Latin*, conceive a man, whose acts as the agent's action, in an individual condition, is as an addressor and an addressee who can want, ask and beg, for example, something, viz., the one who can say things and do them alike. In other words, this study, *in a generalized limitation*, represents a new developmental map and trajectory for all those who deeply work (to solve the problem of ambiguity or intended meaning of linguistics, literature or translation) in a hermeneutical and cross-cultural manner with the aid of the pragmatic re-cognitive approach.

The most important attention has paid to this study is the, strictly speaking, *hermeneutical* approach of the speech act of begging. For this act to be deemed as a pragmatic socialize one, it has to be set at the appropriate basic parameters, at the interaction process, which is recognized by the addressor [who is the cognitive beneficiary agent], the addressee [who is the benefactor agent], and the third party [who might be a passer-by, or a neutral person, and/or a (general) curio user of audiences], viz., Some cases of begging speech act have been executed by a third party who may be one of the addressee's relatives or another one who can function the role of benefactor. This re-cognitive process, according to philosophers' ideas, is based on what has been collected by cognitive agents' actions, who are individuals or groups, in their socialization process. Thus, the researcher distinguishes two essential kinds of beg. Firstly, the speech act of begging, which is represented the core of the requestive process, which is initially preceded by pre-begging (or proper request) and follows by post-begging (or ill-mannered request) for private benefit. Secondly, begging speech act which is instantiated the core of the requestive process, and this type is initially preceded by pre-begging (or decorous request) and follows by post-begging (or sweeping request) for honorable benefit. For the first one, the cognitive agent of the action is symbolized the most transparent picture of beggar as in OAL'sD (2005, p. 125) instance like "*We manage to beg a meal from the café owner,*" whereas the second one is typified the cognitive agent's action at the manner of begger for instance "*She begged that she should be allowed to go,*" (ibid.). Thus, we can, within this study, elaborate that there are multiple (tacit) manners of the *hermeneutical* macro and micro cases of begging speech act since Leech (2014) maintains that the unobvious borderlines of request domain are in its blurry boundaries not only with acts of commands or orders as just noted but also, with other varieties of speech events like *offers, invitations, suggestions and so on*.

Because of the meanings of the speech acts are oft not easy to distinguish, Crystal (2006) assures, the researches' preceding ideas, that the addressor's intentions are not always conspicuous and explicit, in multiple perspectives of pragmatics for language in use, which have become ubiquitous in recent years and therefore, as a consequence for this present study, a satisfying explanatory and *hermeneutical* perspective must necessarily add for the way we use language. Furthermore, it can be assumed, and somehow approached to Crystal's realizations, that the active interpersonal condition of begging speech act is addressed the addressee via the addressor's ways of asking accidentally or deliberately. But of course, there is passive impersonal meanings of this act, especially when the addressor is begged for matters or agents which are absent, or when there is no benefit at his/her mentioned of who or what it is (the agent), or when there is an objectivity (at the border giving line), and not subjectivity, for the common benefit from the result of begging act, viz., when there is an orientable to avoid particularizing it.

There are, of course, pragmatic interactive-negotiated centerpieces, which they are noticed, as I believed, to grasp what the addressor and the addressee can utilize from their actions throughout other actions and things. However, at the homogenous parcel, the intentionalize aspect of the act of begging represents the qualitative use of directives towards things or the world. At the parcel of the *hermeneutical* statement of the precise meaning both to begging speech act and speech acts of directives simultaneously, the intended meaning of begging speech act is to uncover the convoluted way of understanding the goal of the encoded message of the addressor towards the abstracted content by sharing the addressee's decoded reply. When the act of begging is succeeded, it will reflect a cross-cultural pragmatic act at the first axis, whilst the addressee's change mind of replying the addressor's beg represents the second axis since, at the distinction process, there is an adaptation and fit from the intended words to the things and wishes, viz., this reflects the parcel of begging act's investigation. At some philosophical investigations, [valid] taxonomies may employ varying degrees of memberships, overlapping categories, and incomprehensible boundaries since the instantiation of contextual bits and variable propositions will make the parameters and values of begging act like the real assignee of the act, utility, mitigation, etc., at the perspicuous trajectory since the act of begging is expected to be advantageous to the addressor and the addressee alike. At the parcel of semantic, syntactic, and pragmatic realizations, the meaning of begging is firstly reflected via the way of conveying it, while it secondly represents the way of arranging it, in sentences and expressions, in a meaningful technical terms, whereas it thirdly refers to choices of using it and the reasons of these choices.

For the values of position at an equality manner, inequality of social style, the manner of witness, relationships at a social way, the conscious prestige of the addressee's behavior and the age of the addressor and the addressee, as well as the shared significant knowledge of begging message, the collaborative process can create an interpersonal and impersonal convergence at the communicative purposes *like the power-solidarity choose of an apt pronouns of addresses*. In addition to the cognitive-pragmatic forgoing parameters, there are such concluded centerpieces as moods, relevancy, and deixis for time and place, resilience to encounter's power-supremacy outcome(s), and (in) direct-generalized signals.

In a similar important attempt to specify the dimensions of the core of context, Duranti and Goodwin (1992) point out that there are contextual parameters for utilizing the participants, can be served for the same research purpose, such as settings which are concerned, with, the situation of participants at the social and spatial environments; behavioral environment which represents the participants' ways of use their bodies, organized attention, interactive negotiated change and behavioral pattern as resources for organizing those participants' talk; language equals context when it represents the participants' ways in which talk can invoke context and provide context for another talk (for mutual obligation and alignment that they have toward each other), and ultimately extra-situational context which elaborates the apt understanding of the participants' conversational exchange when they depend on their background knowledge. As a consequence, participants (or interlocutors) talk (begging, promising, threatening, etc.) when the logical orders endow them to talk with different rights and obligations, to tell the truth. So, those interlocutors mutually establish regions for knowledge and silence following a set of circular relations and systems of effects of power which, by the way, constitute comfortable furniture of *hermeneutical* procedures of analyzing the saying (of begging speech act) and doing it.

Since persons, in general, have several characteristics and multiple styles of behavior when they are accordingly correlated with performative speech act in general and begging act in particular, this study, likewise the abovementioned parameters, vouchsafes some other *hermeneutical* elucidation, such as Brown and Levinson's (1987) strategies in giving-receiving processes *like the strategies of performing the act which involves*: on record baldly, positive politeness, negative politeness, off record, and the strategy of do not performing the act. Conclusively, the opt of strategy will achieve at the addressor's responsibility who can calculate his/her situation, towards his/her addressee, depending on the scales of social ranking, social power, and social close-far distance, towards the targeted addressee, and vice-versa, viz., those interlocutors try to adopt the advantage of the assumptions of their mutual-knowledge.

Otherwise, most of these abovementioned targeted processes are habitually constrained by the rights and obligations parameters. They are increased to a higher grade in formal situations rather than at the informal one. These distinguishing features are very important, as in Thomas' (1995) viewpoint, to *hermeneuieren* the situation of, begging, speech act, which contains a significant imposition that is achieved with a minimal degree of indirectness. Likewise, Blum-Kulka and House (1989) show that rights and obligations are based on the social nexus ground, and subjected to the requestive goals, especially when they are related to general purposes and rules. Even though the addressor's right to beg for something does not necessarily entail his/her addressee's obligation to comply, the greater level of the addressor's right towards his/her

addressee will outcome the greater level of obligation of compliance at the addressee's side since this scale is subsumed under the concept of legitimation.

As for the conclusion to be performed, directives in general and begging speech act, in particular, should be linked to the realization process. Consequently, the (un)conscious dialogue among syntax, semantics, pragmatics towards the cognitive zone *hermeneutically* seeks to straighten multiple cross-cultural pragmatic accounts of begging speech act to produce re-cognitively, via some selected Shaw's and Al-Hakeem's plays as well as other miscellaneous examples of mine, appropriate *hermeneuticians* which characterize the convoluted nature of implementation of our targeted act. While the question of intentional states of the persons' relationships under pragmatics (and anthropology), via linguistics, has a righteous description, and fructify developmental explanatory and *hermeneutician* of power and solidarity. Throughout neighboring disciplines like *politeness, sociolinguistics, psycholinguistics, and some else others*, the cognitive agent of the action employs cultural pragmatic tactics and tenets to shed intensely light on the mentality of begging of cooperation, and advantageous communicative mode, since person's activity, in accompanied with emotions and harmless reflexive act, has deserved some positive result of replying act either s/he is conscious or not, since the corporeal or incorporeal needs of human-beings represent a real trauma to all pragmatic rules of life, since the characteristics of the cognitive agent's activity, according to the approaches of intentionality, as shown by Lyons (1995), *hermeneutically* contains information, about some-thing/or act, beyond the content and the activity itself, as well as the precise sort of behavior (or attitude) towards that act's content.

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